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Abstract 
This study examines the influence of specialist CEOs on the probability of failure and survivability 
of initial public offering (IPO) firms. We construct a generalist skills index based on CEOs’ past 
employment history in order to classify CEOs into specialist and generalist ones. Specialist CEOs 
pursue a career in particular functional roles, firms and industry sectors, as opposed to generalist 
CEOs who accumulate their work experience through various positions, firms and industries. We 
uncover strong evidence that IPO firms with a specialist CEO have a lower probability of failure and 
a longer time to survive in subsequent periods following the offering. The findings suggest that 
specialist managerial ability has significant implications for post-issue performance of newly listed 
firms. Additionally, specialist CEOs may have incentives that are more aligned with those of the firm 
and its shareholders; thus, they are more likely to enhance the viability of IPO firms for a longer 
period of time.  
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1. Introduction 
The extant empirical evidence from both U.S. and international IPO markets suggests that 
although IPO firms often offer substantial initial returns, they show poor long-run performance with 
around 30% of firms either failing or being acquired in five years subsequent to the offering (see 
Ritter (2003), Ritter and Welch (2002), Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), Loughran et al. (1994) for 
a review of U.S. and international evidence of the phenomena). In the transition from private to 
public ownership, issuing firms face various challenges such as changes in ownership structure and 
governance mechanisms, more stringent scrutiny from capital market participants and regulators, 
increased market competition, etc. (Jain and Kini 2008; Jain and Kini 2000). All of these challenges 
threaten the survivability of IPO firms. Prior studies rigorously investigate various firm-level 
characteristics influencing IPO survival such as underwriter prestige (Schultz 1993), firm age, firm 
size, underpricing, IPO activity level, insider ownership, risk factors (Hensler et al. 1997), audit 
quality (Jain and Martin 2005; Demers and Joos 2007), venture backing (Jain and Kini 2000), board 
effectiveness (Charitou et al. 2007), and earnings management (Alhadab et al. 2014). However, little 
has been known about CEO-level determinants of IPO survival.  
In recent decades, there has been substantially increasing attention to the significance of CEOs 
in the organisational context. In the 1950s, most of CEOs ascended within the firm, were rarely fired, 
and received mainly a basic salary which was slightly higher than their subordinate executives 
(Quigley and Hambrick 2015; Frydman and Jenter 2010; Khurana 2002). However, since the 1990s, 
there have been considerable changes in the perception of CEO significance. CEOs have been 
featured more prominently in the press, more likely to be recruited from outside the firm, more easily 
fired, and have received much larger compensation packages including not only a salary but also 
bonuses and equity compensation (Quigley and Hambrick 2015; Kaplan and Minton 2012; Frydman 
and Jenter 2010; Murphy et al. 2004; Hayward et al. 2004; Khurana 2002). Quigley and Hambrick 
(2015) investigate “CEO effect” based on the dataset spanning 60 years and provide evidence that 
CEOs are actually gaining increasing importance; particularly, the proportion of variation in firm 
performance attributable to CEOs has risen considerably over the decades of the study. Mackey 
(2008) also shows that the CEO effect explains 29.2 percent of the variance in a firm’s performance. 
Remarkably, the upper echelons theory by Hambrick and Mason (1984) postulates that 
managerial background characteristics and experiences can exert an impact on managers’ decision-
making, and thereby influencing organisational outcomes. Particularly, work experience represents 
an important background factor and its significant impact on firms’ strategy adoption has been 
supported by various empirical evidence. Different types of CEOs’ functional experience have been 
examined such as engineering and scientific backgrounds (Malmendier and Tate 2005), financial 
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expertise (Custódio and Metzger 2014), and industry-specific career experience (Huang 2014; 
Custódio and Metzger 2013; Orens and Reheul 2013). Notably, a recent trend in the business 
environment is a substantial growth in the percentage of CEOs with diverse career backgrounds and 
experiences (Crossland et al. 2014). General managerial skills which are more readily transferable 
across firms and industries, as opposed to specialist managerial skills which are more specific to 
particular firms and industries, tend to be more desirable in the executive labour market. Firms are 
more willing to offer higher pay packages to generalist CEOs who acquired general managerial skills 
through various positions, firms and industries than specialist ones whose career experience is more 
focused in particular functional roles, firms and industries (Custódio et al. 2013).  
CEOs are responsible for making important strategic decisions to enable IPO firms to capitalise 
on their post-issue opportunities to survive and grow. Given the growing significance of CEOs in the 
organisational context, and especially, the increasing preference for CEOs with more general 
managerial ability, we question whether there is heterogeneity in the survival profiles following the 
offering between IPO firms having a generalist CEO and those having a specialist CEO. We argue 
that different incentives between generalist and specialist CEOs may explain the differences in their 
course of actions and decision-making, thereby influencing the failure risk and survivability of 
issuing firms. Generalist CEOs may demonstrate different risk-taking incentives which may be 
misaligned with those of the firm (Mishra 2014); and such misalignment is exacerbated by the high 
level of agency problem inherent in the IPO market. Generalist CEOs are more likely to engage in 
job-hopping (Giannetti 2011) and more easily get hired due to their prominent presence in executive 
search databases (Dasgupta and Ding 2010). The higher employability makes their wealth less 
contingent on the future of the firm that they manage. Moreover, prior studies show the tendency of 
CEOs with varied career experiences to deviate from current firm strategies (Hambrick et al. 1993), 
have different risk propensity (Vardaman et al. 2008; Nicholson et al. 2005) and openness to 
experiences (Zimmerman 2008; Boudreau et al. 2001), and favour experimentation and change 
(Crossland et al. 2014). Generalist CEOs may also be more inclined to undertake riskier strategies to 
show the market that they have superior ability. Therefore, generalist CEOs may have more 
incentives to pursue risky projects without much concern about the consequences of such strategies 
on long-term viability of the firm. On the other hand, the job mobility across firms and industries of 
specialist CEOs is more limited (Custódio et al. 2013). Thus, specialist CEOs’ future wealth tends to 
be dependent on the long-term performance of the firm, making them more incentivised to ensure the 
firm’s longevity. Moreover, Crossland et al. (2014) argue that CEOs with lower career variety tend 
to prefer stability in strategic decisions. In addition, considerable industry expertise, thorough 
understanding of the firm, and long-standing relationships with customers and suppliers allow 
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specialist CEOs to develop proper strategic corporate decisions to ensure the survivability of IPO 
firms. Therefore, we expect that firms having a specialist CEO will have a lower probability of 
failure and a higher survival rate. 
We aim to investigate CEOs’ career experience in a wide array of roles, firms, and industry 
sectors to capture the differences among diverse institutional and occupational contexts. Following 
Custódio et al. (2013), we construct a generalist skills index that summarises five features of a 
CEO’s employment history: the number of positions that the CEO held, the number of firms where 
the CEO was employed, the number of industries where the CEO worked, whether the CEO used to 
be a CEO in a different firm, and whether the CEO had experience in a conglomerate. If a CEO’s 
generalist skills index is equal to or above the median of the overall sample, the CEO is categorised 
as a generalist CEO. Otherwise, the CEO is classified as a specialist CEO. Conducting the survival 
analysis on the sample of U.S. common share IPOs from 1999 to 2009, we find that IPO firms with a 
specialist CEO have a lower probability of failure and survive longer in subsequent periods after the 
offering. Particularly, the failure risk of IPO firms with a specialist CEO is 35% that of firms with a 
generalist CEO.  
Some may argue that the measure to categorise CEOs as specialists and generalists does not 
distinguish between specialist-generalist dimension and founder-professional dimension and between 
specialist-generalist dimension and insider-outsider dimension. This is due to the fact that a CEO 
who is a founder and a CEO who is promoted within the firm tend to have prior experiences 
concentrated on a particular firm and industry. Moreover, extant literature often makes an implicit 
assumption that outsiders tend to possess generalist skills, while insiders tend to possess specialist 
skills (e.g., Palomino and Peyrache (2013), Gao and Jain (2011)). Founder CEOs are also often 
characterised by a greater degree of firm specific skills relative to professional CEOs (Yan and 
Rajagopalan (2004), Zhang and Rajagopalan (2003)). Using a similar approach as Brockman et al 
(2016) to disentangle these different dimensions of CEO attributes, we show that it is usual for 
specialists to be professionals and for generalists to be founders. It is also common for specialists to 
be outsiders and for generalists to be insiders. We also find a weak correlation between being a 
specialist and being a founder and between being a specialist and being an insider. The results 
suggest that specialist-generalist, founder-professional and insider-outsider are distinct dimensions of 
CEO attributes. After unravelling the specialist-generalist dimension of CEO characteristics from the 
founder-professional dimension and the insider-outsider dimension, we examine the impacts of 
specialist-generalist versus founder-professional attributes and specialist-generalist versus insider-
outsider attributes on IPO survival. Consistent with the main findings, we document that generalist 
CEOs do not significantly enhance the survivability of IPO firms. Regarding specialist CEOs, those 
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with a combination of specialist and professional skills and those with a mix of specialist and outside 
experiences exert a significant influence on IPO survival. Particularly, the failure risk of IPO firms 
with a specialist professional CEO is 35% the failure risk of firms without a specialist professional 
CEO; and the failure risk of IPO firms with a specialist outsider CEO is around 45% the failure risk 
of firms without a specialist outsider CEO. However, we do not find evidence supporting the role of 
specialist CEOs who are founders or insiders in improving the survival profiles of IPO firms. The 
results suggest that professional expertise accumulated from experiences outside the firm is of 
significant importance for specialist CEOs to be able to enhance the future survivability of IPO 
firms. 
Our paper provides several contributions to the literature. First of all, it contributes to the 
financial literature that emphasizes the influence of managerial characteristics on corporate decisions 
and outcomes. Previous research examines various CEO characteristics such as age (Serfling 2014; 
Orens and Reheul 2013), education (King et al. 2016), early-life experiences (Malmendier et al. 
2011), psychological traits (e.g., overconfidence (Huang et al. 2016; Malmendier et al. 2011; 
Malmendier and Tate 2008, 2005), and risk attitudes (Cain and McKeon 2016; Graham et al. 2013)), 
specific managerial skills (Kaplan et al. 2012), and managers’ fixed effects (Bertrand and Schoar 
2003).  In terms of CEOs’ work experience, prior studies investigate functional experience (Custódio 
and Metzger 2014; Malmendier and Tate 2005), industry expertise (Huang 2014; Custódio and 
Metzger 2013; Orens and Reheul 2013), and career variety (Hu and Liu 2015; Crossland et al. 2014). 
Those studies largely link CEOs’ characteristics and experiences with corporate strategic decisions. 
The empirical evidence of the impact of CEOs’ employment histories on the long-term survivability 
of IPO firms is scarce. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to directly investigate the 
influence of CEOs’ managerial ability on IPO firms' survival profiles. Moreover, Custódio et al. 
(2013) find that generalist CEOs receive higher pay than specialist CEOs and do not find evidence 
indicating that generalist CEOs positively affect firm performance. Our results suggest that generalist 
CEOs are not only more costly than specialist CEOs but also associated with a higher probability of 
failure and a lower survival rate in subsequent periods following the offering. In addition, prior 
literature mainly focuses on analysing firm and offering characteristics influencing the survivability 
of IPO firms (e.g., earnings management (Alhadab et al. 2014), board effectiveness (Charitou et al. 
2007), audit quality (Jain and Martin 2005; Demers and Joos 2007), venture backing (Jain and Kini 
2000), firm age, firm size, underpricing, IPO activity level, insider ownership, risk factors (Hensler 
et al. 1997), and underwriter prestige (Schultz 1993)). We further provide novel evidence of a 
significant manager-level factor determining IPO survival - specialist managerial experience. 
Moreover, our study has important implications for IPO firm’s decisions on CEO appointment. Our 
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findings emphasize the importance of CEOs’ specialist managerial experience in ensuring the 
survivability of IPO issuers.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature and 
hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the sample and explains the survival analysis 
methodology. Section 4 reports empirical findings of the impact of specialist CEOs on the 
probability of failure and time to survive of IPO firms in periods subsequent to the offering. Section 
5 provides discussion and analyses on different aspects of CEO attributes, particularly specialist-
generalist versus founder-professional and specialist-generalist versus insider-outsider, and their 
effects on IPO survival. Section 6 presents several robustness checks of the results. Finally, section 7 
provides concluding remarks.  
 
2. CEOs’ managerial ability and IPO survival 
Upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hambrick 2007) postulates that 
managerial background characteristics and experiences can influence organisational outcomes. 
Various empirical studies provide findings consistent with the theory and document the significance 
of managerial heterogeneity in explaining corporate strategies and performance. For instance, 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that manager fixed effects have significant explanatory power for 
the heterogeneity in various corporate decisions including investment policies such as capital 
expenditures and acquisition, financial policies such as cash holdings, financial leverage, interest 
coverage and dividend payouts, and organisational strategies such as R&D, advertising and 
diversification. Subsequent studies investigate the effects on corporate decisions of managers’ 
psychological traits such as overconfidence and personal risk attitudes (e.g., Huang et al. (2016), 
Cain and McKeon (2016), Graham et al. (2013), Malmendier et al. (2011), Malmendier and Tate 
(2008), Malmendier and Tate (2005)), early life experiences (e.g., Malmendier et al. (2011)), age 
(e.g., Serfling (2014), Orens and Reheul (2013)), and education (e.g., King et al. (2016)). Moreover, 
Mackey (2008) shows that CEO effect explains 29.2 percent of the variance in a firm’s performance 
and the impact is more pronounced at the corporate level than the segment level and in diversified 
firms than focused firms.  
Along with cognitive abilities, personal traits, and observable demographic backgrounds, 
functional experience represents an important factor suggested by the upper echelons theory as 
having crucial implications for managerial decision-making. Prior studies document the significant 
impacts of different types of CEOs’ past work experience on corporate strategy adoption such as 
engineering and scientific backgrounds (Malmendier and Tate 2005), financial expertise (Custódio 
and Metzger 2014), and industry-specific career experience (Huang 2014; Custódio and Metzger 
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2013; Orens and Reheul 2013). Rather than focusing on particular work experience, we attempt to 
investigate the variety in career backgrounds of CEOs. We follow Custódio et al. (2013) and 
construct a generalist skills index based on different aspects of CEOs’ employment experiences. 
Custódio et al. (2013) define general managerial ability as a set of knowledge, skills and experience 
that the CEO acquired from working in various functional roles, firms, and industries in his lifetime 
employment. As opposed to general managerial ability, specialist managerial ability refers to a more 
focused skill set obtained from particular functional roles, firms, and industry sectors. As individuals 
progress through different functions, organisations and business environment, they gain a wide array 
of experiences and broaden their cognitive ability for handling business situations (Dragoni et al. 
2011; Tesluk and Jacobs 1998). Therefore, generalist CEOs may be more desirable among firms with 
more sophisticated operations such as conglomerates (Xuan 2009), and to deal with more complex 
business circumstances such as changes in product market (Hubbard and Palia 1995), technology and 
management practices (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg 2006), restructuring, acquisitions, industry 
shocks and operational distress (Custódio et al. 2013). However, the impact of CEOs’ general 
managerial ability in the IPO context remains unexplored.      
IPO markets demonstrate high information asymmetries. Public information about an IPO 
issuer is scarce and often limited to the prospectus that provides details of the business and the 
offering and includes financial statements for up to the most recent three years. In the presence of the 
information asymmetry, the agency problem arises due to a conflict of interests between the principal 
(i.e., shareholders) and the agent (i.e., managers) (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This creates the 
adverse selection issue when managers have access to private information relevant to the decision-
making, and the moral hazard problem when managers go against shareholders’ interests to act for 
their own benefits. Thus, the agency theory implies that managers can exercise their discretion in the 
firm to influence corporate decisions to achieve their objectives (Bertrand and Schoar 2003). 
Managers’ decisions will be detrimental to the firm if they are not aligned with shareholders’ 
interests.  
Mishra (2014) suggests that CEOs with more general managerial experience demonstrate 
incentives that may not be aligned with those of shareholders and the impact of such incentives 
aggravates in firms exhibiting high agency issues. Particularly, generalist CEOs appear to be 
different from the specialist counterparts in their risk-taking incentives. Generalist CEOs possess 
general managerial skills that are easily transferable across firms and industries and increasingly 
sought after in the executive labour market (Custódio et al. 2013). Thus, they are more likely to take 
advantage of a promising job market and undertake job-hopping (Giannetti 2011). They also tend to 
be featured more prominently in executive search companies’ databases, and thus, more easily 
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recruited (Dasgupta and Ding 2010). Therefore, generalist CEOs’ long-term wealth is less dependent 
on the firm’s future prospects. Moreover, CEOs with varied career experience are less 
psychologically committed to current firm strategies (Hambrick et al. 1993), have different risk 
propensity (Vardaman et al. 2008; Nicholson et al. 2005) and openness to experiences (Zimmerman 
2008; Boudreau et al. 2001), and are more likely to favour experimentation and change (Crossland et 
al. 2014). Generalist CEOs may also attempt to signal to the market that they have superior ability by 
adopting risky strategies. Therefore, generalist CEOs may have more incentives to pursue risky 
projects without much concern about the consequences of such strategies on long-term viability of 
the firm.  
On the contrary, as specialist CEOs’ work experience concentrates on particular functions, 
firms or industries, their choices in switching firms are more limited (Custódio et al. 2013). Poor 
firm performance will reflect worse on specialist CEOs’ employment histories and adversely affect 
their future employability. The lower job mobility across firms and industries makes the future 
prosperity of specialist CEOs crucially depend on the firm’s performance and viability. Thus, 
specialist CEOs may have stronger incentives to ensure that the firm remains viable in the long-term 
as their long-term interests tend to be more closely tied to the firm’s future prospects.  Moreover, the 
long-lasting and on-going involvement in a specific industry and firm equips specialist CEOs with 
considerable industry expertise, thorough understanding of the firm’s business environment, and 
established relationships with customers and suppliers. Therefore, specialist CEOs can make more 
suitable resource allocation decisions that are best suited for the market conditions of a particular 
IPO firm and help the firm adjust to various structural changes resulting from going public. The 
above arguments lead us to expect that specialist CEOs – as opposed to generalist CEOs - will 
significantly make positive contributions to the survivability of IPO firms, specifically IPO firms 
with a specialist CEO are more likely to have a lower probability of failure and a longer time to 
survive in subsequent periods following the offering. 
 
3. Sample and Data 
3.1.  Sample construction 
We construct a sample of U.S. common share IPOs from 1st January 1999 to 31st December 
2009 from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) New Issues database. Following prior IPO 
literature, we impose the following restrictions in arriving at the final sample: (1) The offer price is at 
least five dollars a share, (2) The IPO is not a spin-off, a privatisation, an American depositary 
receipt (ADR), a leveraged buyout (LBO), a real estate investment trust (REIT), a unit offering, a 
rights issue, a limited partnership, a closed-end fund, and a financial institution; (3) For each firm, 
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data are available on Compustat and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We obtain 
financial data from Compustat, stock prices and delisting information from CRSP. We gather 
biographical profiles of CEOs from BoardEx in order to extract CEO characteristics and work 
experience. We also complement our dataset with information on share ownership and executive 
compensation manually collected from S-1 filings available on Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC)’s EDGAR database. After merging the databases and eliminating observations with missing 
values, our final sample consists of 722 IPO firms. 
We track each firm from the IPO date to the earlier of the delisting date or the end of 2014. 
CRSP provides delisting codes to indicate the status of the issuing firm, specifically, whether the 
firm is still trading and specific reasons for delisting such as failure to meet listing standards, 
corporate governance violation, liquidation, insufficient capital, bankruptcy, etc. Based on the CRSP 
delisting codes, we categorise IPO firms into three groups: survived, acquired, and failed firms. All 
firms that are still trading (i.e., code of 100) at the end of 2014 are classified as survived firms. 
Acquired firms are those having the delisting code from 200 to 299, which indicates that the firm 
was acquired in mergers. Following prior research (e.g., Alhadab et al. (2014), Ahmad and Jelic 
(2014), Espenlaub et al. (2012), Jain and Kini (2008), Demers and Joos (2007), Jain and Martin 
(2005), Jain and Kini (2000)), we define failed firms as those that are involuntarily delisted (i.e., 
delisted for negative reasons such as financial distress, liquidation, failure to meet listing standards, 
etc.). Thus, failed firms include those whose delisting code is greater than or equal 300. Our sample 
of 722 IPOs is comprised of 462 survived firms, 206 acquired firms, and 54 failed firms.  
Following Custódio et al. (2013), we employ the principal component analysis (PCA) to 
construct a generalist skills index based on CEOs’ lifetime work experience. This method is also 
used by Mishra (2014) to investigate general managerial skills of CEOs. The index is the first factor 
of applying PCA to five proxies of general managerial ability: (1) the number of roles (e.g., sales, 
marketing, finance, production, etc.) that the CEO held, (2) the number of firms where the CEO was 
employed, (3) the number of industries at the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level 
where the CEO worked, (4) whether the CEO used to be a CEO in another firm, and (5) whether the 
CEO had experience in a conglomerate. A higher index indicates a higher degree of general 
managerial ability. Using one variable instead of five reduces measurement errors and enhances the 
power of the regression tests by mitigating the multicollinearity problem (Custódio et al. 2013). 
Based on the index, we classify a CEO as a generalist or a specialist. The CEO is categorised as a 
specialist if the generalist skills index is below the overall median, and as a generalist otherwise.  
 
3.2. Data description 
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Table 1 presents the distribution by issue year and industry of the overall sample and the three 
sub-samples: failed, acquired, and survived firms. Panel A shows the distribution of IPOs from 1999 
to 2009. Tracking from the offering date to the end of 2014, 41% of the firms survived, 47% were 
acquired, and 12 % failed. Tracking for five years after the issue date, 64% of the firms survived, 
29% were acquired, and 7% failed. Consistent with prior literature, we find that approximately 36% 
of IPOs either fail or are acquired within five years after the offering.   
Panel B shows the distribution by issue year. There is a clustering of IPOs around 1999-2000 
and 2004-2007. The crash of the stock market in 2001 following the collapse of the Dot-com bubble 
considerably reduced the number of IPO deals being initiated during 2001-2003. The IPO market 
rebounded from 2004 to 2007 before plummeting again due to the 2008 financial crisis. The 
percentage of firms being delisted for negative reasons within five years after the issue date is 
highest for firms going public in 1999 and 2008 (15%). This is consistent with the economic crises in 
those years, which had an adverse impact on the IPO firms’ survivability. The percentage of firms 
being acquired in five years after the issue is highest for IPOs in 1999 (38%) and lowest for those in 
2008 (14%). For IPOs in other years, the percentage of acquired firms range from 22% to 36%. In 
general, more than half of the firms survive for five years after the IPO, except for IPOs in 1999 
which have the lowest proportion of survived firms (47%).  
Panel C displays the distribution by two-digit SIC code industry. IPO firms cluster in industries 
that develop high technological products including chemical products, computer equipment and 
services, electronic equipment, and scientific instruments. These industries also have the highest 
percentage of IPOs that are acquired within five years after the offering (over 30%). In all industries, 
the majority of IPOs survive for five years subsequent to the stock issue. In particular, the proportion 
of survived firms is highest in entertainment services and oil and gas industries. Food products and 
manufacturing are the industries with the highest percentage of failed firms (20% and 24% 
respectively). The sectors with the lowest proportion of failed firms are electronic equipment (4%) 
and oil and gas (5%). The percentage of failed firms in other industries ranges from 5% to 8%.  
Table 2 illustrates the survival distribution by issue year and industry for the two groups of IPO 
firms: those with a specialist CEO and those with a generalist CEO. The survival profiles are 
examined for five years following the offering. Panel A provides the survival distribution by issue 
year. For each year in the sample period, there are differences in the proportion of firms with a 
specialist CEO and those with a generalist CEO.  From 1999 to 2002, the percentage of IPO firms 
with a generalist CEO increase steadily from 51% in 1999 to 63% in 2000 and 73% in 2002.  
However, from 2003, IPO firms with a specialist CEO account for a greater proportion, with the 
yearly percentage ranges from 50% to 64%. This pattern is indicative of the greater appreciation of 
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CEOs’ specialist skills and experience among IPO firms. The cumulative percentage of failed firms 
is lower for IPO firms with a specialist CEO in most years. For the overall sample, the cumulative 
percentage of firms failing within five years after the offering is 6% for firms with a specialist CEO 
compared with 9% for firms with a generalist CEO.  
Panel B provides the survival distribution by industry. Specialist CEOs have more presence in 
manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade sectors, and particularly, in industries that develop high 
technological products such as chemical products, computer equipment and services, and electronic 
equipment. The five-year cumulative percentage of failed firms is lower for IPO firms with a 
specialist CEO than those with a generalist CEO in all industries except for manufacturing, food 
products and oil and gas industries. Overall, the results so far suggest that IPO firms with a specialist 
CEO tend to have a lower failure rate than those with a generalist CEO. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the overall sample and the sub-samples of IPO 
firms with a specialist CEO and those with a generalist CEO. Panel A presents the summary statistics 
of CEOs’ work experience. On average, a CEO used to work in 5 functional areas, 5 firms, and 1 
industry before he or she became the CEO of the current firm. In addition, 52% of CEOs worked as a 
CEO in another firm and 37% had experience in a conglomerate. In general, a specialist CEO 
performed approximately 3 different roles and worked for around 3 firms in one industry. 33% of 
specialist CEOs used to be a CEO in another firm, and 13% were employed by a conglomerate. 
Work histories of generalist CEOs typically include experience in around 7 positions, 7 firms, and 2 
industries. 70% of generalist CEOs had CEO experience in another firm and 61% worked for a 
conglomerate.  
Panel B provides the descriptive statistics of CEO characteristics. On average, a CEO is 
approximately 50 years old and has been serving the firm for 4 years. 3% of CEOs are female, 27% 
are recruited internally, 37% hold the roles of both CEO and chairman of the board, and 27% are also 
a founder of the firm. The mean share ownership of a CEO is 13%. In terms of compensation, a CEO 
earns annually an average of 658 thousand dollars in cash compensation, 690 thousand dollars in 
equity compensation, and 1.67 million dollars in total compensation. With regard to education, 26% 
of CEOs have an MBA, 10% have a PhD, and 17% graduated from an Ivy League institution. 
Specialist CEOs are significantly different from generalist CEOs in all the characteristics examined 
except for gender and cash compensation. A specialist CEO is younger than a generalist counterpart 
(48 versus 51 years old). The average tenure of a specialist CEO is 5 years, which is one year longer 
than that of a generalist CEO. The percentage of specialist CEOs hired internally is significantly 
higher than that of generalist CEOs (29% and 24% respectively). Moreover, specialist CEOs are 
more likely to hold the dual positions of CEO and chairman of the board (39% of specialist CEOs 
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compared with 34% of generalist CEOs). The percentage of specialist CEOs who are a founder 
(35%) is almost double that of generalist CEOs (20%). Specialist CEOs also have significantly 
higher share ownership than generalist counterparts (14% versus 11%). The longer tenure, higher 
share ownership, and higher proportion of CEOs being a founder and those holding dual roles of 
CEO and chairman imply that specialist CEOs tend to have a stronger tie with the firm than 
generalist CEOs. In terms of compensation, while cash compensation is not significantly different 
between the two groups of CEOs, equity compensation and total compensation are significantly 
higher for generalist CEOs than specialist ones. The average equity compensation of a generalist 
CEO is 829 thousand dollars, while that of a specialist CEO is 553 thousand dollars. The average 
total compensation of a generalist CEO is 1.87 million dollars, while that of a specialist CEO is 1.47 
million dollars. This is consistent with the finding by Custódio et al. (2013) that generalist CEOs are 
paid significantly higher than specialist ones. With regard to education, significantly more generalist 
CEOs hold an MBA compared to specialist CEOs (30% versus 23%). However, for a more 
specialized degree like a PhD, the percentage of specialist CEOs with this degree is significantly 
higher than that of generalist CEOs (13% versus 8%). In addition, a higher proportion of generalist 
CEOs are Ivy League alumni than that of specialist CEOs (21% versus 14%).  
Panel C presents the firm and offering characteristics for the overall sample and the sub-
samples of firms with a specialist CEO and those with a generalist CEO. IPO firms are generally 
young and small with the mean firm age of 17 years and the mean total sales of 402 million dollars. 
They have the mean ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
(EBITDA) to total assets of -0.03 and the mean leverage ratio of 0.14. Moreover, IPO issuers exhibit 
a low degree of diversification; specifically, on average, they operate in one business segment. In 
addition, issuing firms allocate resources considerably in R&D and capital investments with the 
mean R&D and capital expenditure intensity of 10% and 6% respectively, while the mean 
advertising intensity is merely 2%. Issuers raise an average of 145 million dollars in the offering. 
They have the mean initial returns of 28% and the mean market to book ratio of 4.12. Around half of 
the IPOs are underwritten by top-tier investment banks, 57% are venture backed, and 92% are 
audited by big four auditors. Moreover, 45% of firms are in a high-tech industry. With regard to 
delisting events, on average, 7% of IPO firms are delisted due to negative reasons within 5 years 
after the offering.  
IPO firms with a specialist CEO are significantly different from those with a generalist CEO in 
most of the firm and offering characteristics, except for the market-to-book ratio and the percentage 
of firms receiving venture capital financing, being audited by big four accounting firms, and being in 
the high tech industry. On average, firms with a generalist CEO are more established with 19 years 
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in operation compared to 16 years for firms with specialist CEOs. The average sales of firms with a 
generalist CEO (526 million dollars) nearly double that of firms with a specialist CEOs (277 million 
dollars). Firms with a generalist CEO tend to be more diversified than those with a specialist CEO. 
The proceeds raised in the offering by firms with a generalist CEO (170 million dollars) are 
significantly higher than by firms with a specialist CEO (119 million dollars). The findings that firms 
with a generalist CEO are larger and more diversified than those with a specialist CEO are consistent 
with the literature. For example, Custódio et al. (2013) show that generalist CEOs are preferred in 
multi-segment firms which have more complex operations. In terms of investment policies, R&D, 
advertising and capital investments are not significantly different between the two groups. In 
addition, firms with a specialist CEO are more profitable and less leveraged (profitability ratio of -
0.01 and leverage ratio of 0.13) than firms with a generalist CEO (profitability ratio of -0.05 and 
leverage ratio of 0.16). A higher proportion of firms with a generalist CEO have the offering 
underwritten by reputable investment banks (54%) than firms with a specialist CEO (49%). Notably, 
IPO firms with a specialist CEO is less underpriced than those with a generalist CEO. This implies 
that generalist CEOs may have different risk-taking incentives, resulting in a higher agency problem; 
thus, investors require higher returns to compensate for the increased uncertainties. Regarding the 
delisting incident, significantly higher percentage of IPO firms with a generalist CEO are delisted 
due to negative reasons within five years after the issue than that of firms with a specialist CEO (9% 
and 6% respectively). Finally, Panel D provides the correlation matrix of the variables used in our 
analyses. No multicollinearity is detected among the variables.  
 
4. Empirical analysis of the impact of specialist CEOs on IPO survival 
4.1.  Survival analysis methodology 
Survival analysis is a statistical technique that has been used extensively in prior research to 
examine determinants of IPO survival (e.g., Alhadab et al. (2014), Espenlaub et al. (2012), Gerakos 
et al. (2013), Carpentier and Suret (2011), Jain and Martin (2005), Fama and French (2004), Jain and 
Kini (2000), Hensler et al. (1997)). Its primary benefit over regression analysis such as cross-
sectional logistic models lies in its ability to account for both event occurrence and time to event. In 
addition, survival analysis is also useful in examining censored data and time-series data with 
different time horizons (Shumway 2001; LeClere 2000). The survival time of IPO firms is right 
censored because many firms do not encounter failure for the duration of the study. The time 
window is different for each firm depending on the IPO date. For example, in our analysis, IPO firms 
are tracked until the end of 2014. Thus, a firm that went public in 1999 is tracked for 15 years 
compared to 5 years for a firm that went public in 2009.  
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In analysing the association between specialist CEOs and IPO survival, we employ both 
nonparametric and semiparametric approaches. Nonparametric estimates of hazard and survival 
functions allow us to compare the failure risks and survival rates of IPO firms with a specialist CEO 
and those with a generalist CEO, thereby determining whether specialist CEOs improve issuing 
firms’ survival profiles. The hazard function provides the conditional probability of failure given that 
the firm has survived up to the specified time. If specialist CEOs can reduce the failure risk, the 
hazard function for IPO firms with a specialist CEO will remain below that of firms with a generalist 
CEO. We estimate the hazard functions for the two groups of IPO firms using the Nelson-Aalen 
estimator, which is defined as: 
 
(1) 
where  is the number of failed firms at time , and  is the number of firms at risk at time . 
The survival function provides the probability that the firm survives up to a particular time. If 
specialist CEOs can enhance the survivability of issuing firms, the survival function curve of firms 
with a specialist CEO will be above that of firms with a generalist CEO. We estimate the survival 
functions of the two groups of IPO firms using the Kaplan-Meier estimator, which is defined as: 
 
(2) 
where  is the number of failed firms at time , and  is the number of firms at risk at time . In 
addition, we use the log-rank test to examine the difference between the estimated survival curves of 
IPO firms with a specialist CEO and those with a generalist CEO.  
With regard to the semiparametric approach, we employ Cox proportional hazards model. The 
primary advantage of Cox proportional hazards model over other hazards models is that the baseline 
hazard function does not have to be pre-specified and can take any functional form (Allison 2000). In 
addition, no assumption needs to be made about the distribution of event dates (Alhadab et al. 2014). 
We estimate the model as follows: 
 
] 
(3
) 
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where  is the baseline hazard function, and  is the time to failure (i.e., the duration to the 
delisting date). The dependent variable indicates the failure risk; thus, a positive (negative) 
coefficient suggests that failure is more (less) likely to happen and the survival time is shorter 
(longer). The hazard ratio for each independent variable is computed as the exponentiated coefficient 
for the variable. It measures the increase in failure risk for a unit increase in the value of the 
independent variable. For indicator variables, the risk ratio is the ratio of the estimated hazard for 
those with the value of one to the estimated hazard for those with the value of zero. For continuous 
variables, the estimated change in the hazard rate for a unit increase in the independent variable is 
100*(hazard ratio – 1) (Alhadab et al. 2014; Jain and Martin 2005; Allison 2000). 
The main variable of interest is specialist CEO, which indicates whether the CEO has specialist 
managerial ability. Besides the indicator variable specialist CEO, for robustness check, we also run 
the regressions on generalist skills index, and the individual five proxies employed to construct the 
index, namely, number of roles, number of firms, number of industries, CEO experience dummy and 
conglomerate experience dummy. We control for various firm and offering characteristics that are 
suggested by prior literature as determinants of IPO survival. Specifically, we include variables 
log(firm age), log(sales), log(proceeds) and initial returns to account for the positive effects of firm 
age, firm size, and underpricing on IPO survival as documented by Hensler et al. (1997). Moreover, 
Schultz (1993) finds the positive association between reputable underwriters and IPO survival. Jain 
and Kini (2000) indicate that the involvement of venture capitalists in the IPO process improves the 
survival profiles of IPO firms. Jain and Martin (2005) document that IPO firms audited by high-
quality accounting firms survive longer in the following years. To capture the impacts of these 
financial intermediaries on IPO survival, we include indicator variables top-tier underwriter, venture 
capitalist, and big4 auditor. Furthermore, we add the variable leverage to control for the firm’s 
leverage based on the finding of Demers and Joos (2007) that the leverage ratio of IPO firms is 
positively related to the probability of failure. Additionally, Jain and Kini (2008) argue that 
managers’ strategic investment choices at the time of the IPO may influence the post-issue 
performance of IPO firms; particularly, the probability of IPO survival is positively associated with 
R&D intensity and product diversification. We control for this effect by adding variables indicating 
strategic investment decisions of the firm, namely R&D, advertising, capital expenditure, and 
diversification. Furthermore, we account for the firm performance by including the variable 
profitability and the growth opportunity proxied by the market-to-book ratio as suggested by 
Alhadab et al. (2014). In addition, we control for the CEO’s structural power by adding variables 
CEO-Chairman and CEO-Founder. Since there may be differences in the survival profiles of IPO 
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firms in different industries and years, we also add to the model industry and year fixed effects. The 
definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. 
 
4.2. Empirical results 
4.2.1. Analysis of the hazard and survival curves 
The hazard and survival functions for both groups of IPO firms with specialist CEOs and those 
with generalist CEOs are estimated. The plots of Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimates and 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates are provided in Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively. In Figure 1, the 
hazard function of IPO firms with a specialist CEO is below that of firms with a generalist CEO. The 
gap widens as the length of time following the issue increases. On the contrary, as can be seen from 
Figure 2, the survival function of IPO firms with a specialist CEO is above that of firms with a 
generalist CEO. The longer the time elapses after the issue, the broader the gap is between the 
survival functions of the two groups. The probability of surviving 5 years after the issue is 94% for 
firms with a specialist CEO, compared to 89% for firms with a generalist CEO. The survival 
probability after 10 years following the issue decreases considerably for firms with a generalist CEO 
to 79%, while this probability is 88% for firms with a specialist CEO. In addition, the log-rank test 
for the equality of survival functions shows that the estimated survival curves of the two groups are 
different at the 1% significance level. Overall, the plots of hazard and survival functions demonstrate 
that IPO firms with a specialist CEO have a lower risk profile and a higher survival profile compared 
to firms with a generalist CEO. The nonparametric approach of the survival analysis provides 
evidence suggesting that specialist CEOs tend to improve the survival profiles of IPO issuers. 
 
4.2.2. Estimation of the Cox proportional hazards model 
Table 4 presents the results of the Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure and 
time-to-failure which assesses the impact of having a specialist CEO on IPO survival after 
controlling for various firm factors influencing the survivability. In specification (1), the coefficient 
on specialist CEO is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that IPO firms with a 
specialist CEO have a lower probability of failure and a longer time to survive in the periods 
following the offering. This result is consistent with our previous finding in the nonparametric 
analysis that IPO firms with a specialist CEO survive for a longer period than those with a generalist 
CEO. The hazard ratio of 0.351 suggests that the failure risk of IPO firms with a specialist CEO is 35 
% of the failure risk of firms with a generalist CEO.  
Specifications (2) to (7) estimate the regressions on generalist skills index, and the five 
measures of managerial skills employed to generate the index, specifically, number of roles, number 
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of firms, number of industries, CEO experience dummy and conglomerate experience dummy. We 
find positive and significant coefficients on all those variables. This suggests that IPO firms managed 
by CEOs who possess more general managerial ability in terms of varied experience in different 
roles, firms, and industries have a higher probability of failure and a shorter time to survive. The 
hazard ratio of 1.443 of the variable generalist skills index indicates that for each unit increase in the 
general ability index, the firm’s failure risk increases by 44.3%. The variables number of roles, 
number of firms, and number of industries have the risk ratios of 1.217, 1.157, and 1.314 
respectively. This implies that for each additional number of roles, firms and industries in which the 
CEO worked, the failure risk increases by 21.7%, 15.7% and 31.4% respectively. The variables CEO 
experience dummy and conglomerate experience dummy have the hazard ratios of 1.717 and 1.634 
respectively. This suggests that the failure risks of firms whose CEOs used to work as a CEO in 
another firm and had prior experience in a conglomerate are 172% and 163% the failure risks of 
firms whose CEOs do not have such experiences.  
The coefficients on control variables are consistent across all specifications. In general, the 
signs of the control variables are in line with prior literature. We find that larger, more profitable, and 
growing firms have a lower probability of failure and a longer time to survive. However, firms with 
higher underpricing and leverage tend to have higher failure risks in subsequent periods and survive 
for a shorter time. We do not find a significant association between IPO survival and strategic 
investment decisions including R&D, capital expenditure and diversification. The coefficient on 
advertising is marginally significant. Moreover, the mean values of R&D, advertising, and capital 
expenditure presented in Table 3 do not show significant differences between IPO firms with a 
specialist CEO and those with a generalist CEO. Therefore, it appears that specialist CEOs influence 
the survival of IPO firms through a different channel other than strategic investment decisions such 
as R&D, advertising, capital expenditure, and diversification. Notably, the coefficient on leverage is 
strongly significant at the 1% level across specifications. Additionally, the mean leverage is 
significantly lower for IPO firms with a specialist CEO than those with a generalist CEO as 
described in Table 3. Therefore, it is plausible that financial leverage may be a channel through 
which specialist CEOs influence IPO firms’ survival profiles. Specialist CEOs may be more risk-
averse, and they may want to reduce the firms’ overall risks through more conservative financial 
policies such as maintaining lower leverage ratios. Overall, the results from the Cox proportional 
hazards model support our hypothesis that IPO firms with a specialist CEO have a lower probability 
of failure and a longer time to survive in subsequent periods following the offering. 
 
5. Specialist-Generalist versus Founder-Professional and Insider-Outsider attributes 
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In our study, we follow Custódio et al. (2013) to define generalist CEOs as those whose past 
work experience spans across various positions, firms and industries while specialist CEOs as whose 
employment history focuses on specific roles, firms and industries.  To categorise CEOs according to 
the specialist-generalist dimension, we employ the generalist skills index developed by Custódio et 
al. (2013) which measures the general ability of a CEO based on the number of roles, firms and 
industries in which the CEO has worked, as well as whether the CEO used to be a CEO in a different 
firm and whether the CEO worked in a conglomerate. Based on this measurement, it is very likely 
that a CEO who is a founder and a CEO who is appointed within the firm are considered specialist 
CEOs as a founder CEO and an insider CEO tend to accumulate their expertise and experience from 
the particular firm and industry. Thus, it is arguable that this measure does not distinguish between 
specialist-generalist dimension and founder-professional dimension and between specialist-generalist 
dimension and insider-outsider dimension. Prior studies sometimes implicitly assume that outsiders 
tend to possess generalist skills, while insiders tend to possess specialist skills (e.g., Palomino and 
Peyrache (2013), Gao and Jain (2011)). Founder CEOs are often characterised by having more firm 
specific skills relative to professional CEOs (Yan and Rajagopalan (2004), Zhang and Rajagopalan 
(2003)). However, a recent study by Brockman et al. (2016) documents that specialist-generalist and 
insider-outsider are two different CEO attributes; and thus, insiderness (outsiderness) cannot be used 
as a reliable proxy for specialist skills (generalist skills). Regarding specialist-generalist versus 
founder-professional, little has been done to explicitly unravel these two aspects of CEO 
characteristics.   
To rule out the possible effects of founder CEOs and insider CEOs due to the way the 
Specialist CEO variable is constructed, we re-estimate the Cox proportional hazard model on 
Specialist CEO for the sample of IPO firms excluding firms with a founder CEO and the sample of 
IPO firms excluding firms with an insider CEO. The results are presented in Table 5. Consistent with 
the main results, we find that the coefficients on Specialist CEO are negative and significant at the 
1% level. Thus, the main finding that IPO firms with a specialist CEO tend to have a lower 
probability of failure and a longer time to survive is robust to the exclusion of firms with a founder 
CEO and firms with an insider CEO.  
Furthermore, we apply the approach by Brockman et al. (2016) to disentangle specialist-
generalist attributes from founder-professional and insider-outsider attributes. Table 6 presents the 
number of CEOs across the specialist-generalist, founder-professional, and insider-outsider 
dimensions. Panel A illustrates the count of CEOs in specialist-generalist versus founder-
professional dimensions. In the overall sample, 126 CEOs are specialist-founders, 234 are specialist-
professionals, 71 are generalist-founders and 291 are generalist-professionals. Out of the 197 
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founders, 126 (64%) are specialists. Out of 360 specialists, 234 (65%) are professionals. We also 
observe 55% of professionals are generalists and 20% of generalists are founders. Thus, in a slightly 
more than half of the case, founders are specialists and professionals are generalists. However, more 
than half specialists are founders and it is usual for generalists to be founders. This result does not 
strongly support the notion that professionals are generalists and founders are specialists.  
Additionally, we rank and categorise CEOs into quartile groups based on the generalist skills 
index. Panel B presents the number of CEOs according to the specialist skills in quartiles and the 
founder-professional dimension. We observe that 67 (34%) founders and 115 (22%) professionals 
are in the highest specialist category; and 32 (16%) of founders and 149 (28%) professionals are in 
the highest generalist category. This result suggests that while founders are more likely to be highly 
specialists and professionals are more likely to be highly generalists, it is not uncommon for highly 
specialists to be professionals and highly generalists to be founders. We also test the correlation 
between General skills index and Founder CEO and between Specialist CEO and Founder CEO. In 
untabulated results, we find the correlations are -0.1643 and 0.1727 respectively. It suggests a weak 
correlation between being a founder CEO and having specialist skills. Overall, the results suggest 
that CEO specialist-generalist and CEO founder-professional attributes are distinct CEO 
characteristics. 
Similarly, we examine the distribution of CEOs according to the specialist-generalist and 
insider-outsider dimensions and present the results in Panel C. Out of 722 CEOs in our sample, 106 
CEOs are specialist-insiders, 254 are specialist-outsiders, 86 are generalist-insiders and 276 are 
generalist-outsiders. There are 106 specialists (55%) out of 192 insiders and 276 generalist (52%) out 
of 530 outsiders. We also observe 254 out of 530 of outsiders (or 48%) are specialists and 86 out of 
192 insiders (or 45%) are generalists. The results suggest that although specialists are more likely to 
be insiders and generalists are more likely to be outsiders, a little less than half of outsiders are 
specialists and a little less than half of insiders are generalists. Moreover, we check the correlation 
between Generalist skills index and Insider CEO and between Specialist CEO and Insider CEO. In 
untabulated results, we find the correlations are -0.0594 and 0.0644 respectively. It indicates a low 
correlation between an insider CEO and a specialist CEO. Thus, consistent with Brockman et al. 
(2016), we find that insider-outsider and specialist-generalist skills are distinct CEO attributes.  
An IPO is an important development stage in which the firm evolves from a private firm to a 
public firm with a more complex organisational system. The transition to a public status exposes IPO 
firms to various challenges due to changes in the ownership and governance structure, more stringent 
scrutiny from regulators and market participants and higher expectations from investors and analysts. 
Prior studies document several advantages of founder CEO leadership relative to professional one 
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such as lower agency costs, greater organisational influence, stronger psychological attachment with 
the firm, higher degree of firm specific skills, larger ownership stakes, stronger economic ties and 
longer investment horizons (Gao and Jain (2011), He (2008), Nelson (2003), Certo et al. (2001), 
Begley (1995)). Extant literature also shows the downside of founder CEOs which may hinder firm 
performance such as the entrenchment behaviour regarding the market for corporate control, the lack 
of diversification and insufficient skills and experience in managing a public firm in a transition to a 
different stage in its evolution (Gao and Jain (2011), Adams et al. (2009), Wasserman (2003)). 
Moreover, organisational life cycle theory posits that top management needs different managerial 
skill sets during various phases of development. It suggests that as new ventures evolve and grow, 
managerial styles and capabilities of the founder are inadequate to lead the firm effectively (He 
(2008), Certo et al. (2001)). Prior literature also examines the differences between outsider CEOs 
and insider CEOs. Particularly, insider CEOs possess firm specific knowledge and skills obtained 
from their experience within the firm. Relative to insider CEOs, outsider CEOs tend to have more 
limited understanding of the firm’s resources and constraints (Greiner et al. 2003). Nevertheless, they 
can bring fairly novel skills and expertise (Zhang and Rajagopalan (2010), Yan and Rajagopalan 
(2004), Zhang and Rajagopalan (2003)). Thus, they are often hired when firms anticipate substantial 
corporate changes (Cannella and Lubatkin 1993). As founder versus professional CEOs and insider 
versus outsider CEOs bring different experiences and expertise, they may exert different impacts on 
the long-term survivability of IPO firms. In the main analysis, we document that CEOs with 
specialist skills are more likely to enhance the survival profiles of IPO firms. We also show that 
specialist-generalist, founder-professional and insider-outsider are different aspects of CEO 
characteristics which may influence firm performance differently. Thus, it would be useful to 
investigate whether the differences are relevant to the association between specialist skills and IPO 
survivability. 
First, we categorize CEOs in four groups according to the specialist-generalist and founder-
professional dimensions: specialist-founder, specialist-professional, generalist-founder and 
generalist-professional. We then re-estimate the Cox proportional hazard model on these four 
indicator variables and present the results in Panel A of Table 7. We find a negative and significant 
coefficient on Specialist-Professional and a positive and significant coefficient on Generalist-
Professional. This suggests that IPO firms whose CEOs possess professional and specialist 
managerial skills have a lower probability of failure and a longer time to survive. The hazard ratio of 
the variable Specialist-Professional is 0.352. This indicates that the failure risk of IPO firms with a 
specialist professional CEO is 35% the failure risk of firms without a specialist professional CEO. 
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The coefficients on Specialist-Founder and Generalist-Founder are not significant, suggesting that 
having a founder CEO does not significantly improve IPO survivability.  
Second, we classify CEOs in four categories according to the specialist-generalist and insider-
outsider dimensions: specialist-insider, specialist-outsider, generalist-insider and generalist-outsider. 
We re-run the Cox proportional hazard regressions on these four indicator variables and present the 
results in Panel B of Table 7. We find a negative and significant coefficient on Specialist-Outsider 
and a positive and significant coefficient on Generalist-Outsider; whereas the coefficients on 
Specialist-Insider and Generalist-Insider are not significant. This suggests that IPO firms with 
specialist outsider CEOs have a lower probability of failure and a longer time to survive, while 
having an insider CEO does not significantly reduce the probability of failure and lengthen the time 
to survive. Moreover, the hazard ratio of the variable Specialist-Outsider is 0.448, indicating that the 
failure risk of IPO firms with a specialist outsider CEO is around 45% the failure risk of firms 
without a specialist outsider CEO. 
 Overall, after taking into account the founder-professional and insider-outsider aspects of 
CEO attributes in the analysis of the impacts of specialist CEOs on IPO survival, we find that IPO 
firms are benefited from the combination of specialist skills and professional expertise accumulated 
from prior experience outside the firm. Specifically, IPO firms with a specialist professional CEO 
and those with a specialist outsider CEO have a significantly lower probability of failure and a longer 
time to survive in the post-issue period.  
 
6. Robustness checks 
6.1.  Controlling for high-tech industries and crisis periods 
High-tech industries are characterised by high growth, continuous technological advancements 
and substantial competition, while crisis periods put considerable financial constraints on the firm. 
Thus, high-tech industries and crisis periods create more challenges for the job of a CEO and require 
the CEO to make more careful consideration to decide the most plausible actions to help the firm to 
withstand competitive pressures and market shocks. Thus, we evaluate whether the association 
between specialist CEOs and IPO survival differs depending on whether the firm is in a high-tech 
industry and whether the firm goes public during the financial crisis period. 
Table 8 presents the results of the Cox proportional hazards model controlling for high-tech 
industries. In specification (1), the main Cox proportional hazards model (Equation (3)) includes the 
interaction effect between specialist CEO and high-tech industry. The coefficient on specialist CEO 
remains negative and significant, indicating that IPO firms led by a specialist CEO have a lower 
probability of failure and a longer time to survive. The coefficient on the interaction term specialist 
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CEO*high-tech industry is not significant; thus, the influence of specialist CEOs on IPO survival is 
not significantly different when the firm is in a high-tech industry. In specifications (2) and (3), the 
main Cox proportional hazards model (Equation (3)) is performed for the sub-samples of IPO firms 
that are in a high-tech industry and those are not. We continue to find that specialist CEOs improve 
the survival profiles of IPO firms. For issuers in a high tech industry, those with a specialist CEO 
have the failure risk of 47.2% the failure risk of those with a generalist CEO. For issuers not in a 
high tech industry, the failure risk of those with a specialist CEO is 55.8% that of those with a 
generalist CEO.  
Table 9 reports the results of the Cox proportional hazards model controlling for crisis periods. 
In specification (1), the main model (Equation (3)) includes the interaction effect between specialist 
CEO and crisis period. Consistent with the results reported in the main analysis, we find that having 
specialist CEOs is associated with a lower probability of failure and a longer time to survive. The 
coefficient on the interaction term specialist CEO * crisis period is not significant. This implies that 
the association between specialist CEOs and the survivability of IPO firms is not affected by crisis 
periods. In specifications (2) and (3), the main model (Equation (3)) is re-estimated for the sub-
samples of IPOs that are in a crisis period and those that are not. We still find that specialist CEOs 
are associated with lower failure risks. IPO firms managed by a specialist CEO in a crisis period 
have the failure risk of 8.6% the failure risk of firms managed by a generalist CEO. For IPOs not in a 
crisis period, the failure risk of issuers with a specialist CEO is 37.3% that of issuers with a 
generalist CEO. Overall, our findings reported in the main analysis still hold when we control for 
high-tech industries and crisis periods.  
 
6.2.  Controlling for CEO power 
Adams et al. (2005) argue that more powerful CEOs tend to make decisions with extreme 
consequences; thus, firms whose CEOs have more power over the board are more likely to exhibit 
more variability in performance. In the next robustness test, we examine whether the impact of 
specialist CEOs on the survivability of IPO firms is driven by CEOs’ decision-making power. We 
follow the literature on CEO power (e.g., Han et al. (2016), Jiraporn et al. (2014), Baldenius et al. 
(2014), Chikh and Filbien (2011), Liu and Jiraporn (2010); Adams et al. (2005) and examine four 
power dimensions suggested by Finkelstein (1992), namely, structural power, ownership power, 
expert power, and prestige power. As a proxy for structural power, we use the variable CEO-
Chairman, which indicates whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board, as CEO duality can 
be considered as the highest rank in the corporate hierarchy. As a proxy for ownership power, we use 
the variable CEO-Founder, which indicates whether the CEO is also a founder of the firm, and CEO 
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ownership, which indicates the percentage of shares owned by the CEO. As a proxy for expert 
power, we use the variable CEO tenure, which indicates the duration of the CEO’s service at the 
firm. Longer tenured CEOs tend to have a higher status, more experience, and better understanding 
of the firm. As a proxy for prestige power, we use the variable Ivy League alumnus, which indicates 
whether the CEO was graduated from an Ivy League institution. We then estimate a CEO power 
index as the first factor of applying the principal component analysis to the five proxies of CEO 
power. Based on the CEO power index, we classify a CEO as a powerful CEO if his or her power 
index is greater than the overall median. Our t-test of the difference in the means of power scores 
between specialist CEOs and generalist ones (unreported) shows significant results, suggesting that 
on average specialist CEOs are more powerful than generalist counterparts.  
Table 10 presents the results of the Cox proportional hazards model controlling for CEO 
power. In specification (1), we include an interaction term between specialist CEO and powerful 
CEO in our main model (Equation3). We continue to find a significant and negative coefficient on 
specialist CEO, indicating that IPO firms with a specialist CEO tend to have lower failure risks. The 
coefficient on the interaction term is not significant. Thus, the influence of specialist CEOs on IPO 
survival does not differ depending on the magnitude of CEO power. Moreover, re-estimating the 
main model (Equation (3)) on the sub-samples of IPO firms with and without powerful CEOs 
provides us with similar results to the main finding. Specialist CEOs significantly reduce the 
probability of failure and enhance the time to survive. Among firms whose CEOs have more 
decision-making power, IPO firms with a specialist CEO have the failure risk of 34.8% the failure 
risk of firms with a generalist CEO. This figure is only 7.3% among firms without powerful CEOs. 
 
6.3.  Controlling for endogeneity problem 
First of all, we check whether the influence of specialist CEOs on IPO survival is driven by 
CEO characteristics other than past work experience. Thus, we include additional variables in the 
main regression (Equation (3)) to control for several observable executive characteristics. Prior 
literature suggests that strategic decision-making may be influenced by CEO age, tenure, and 
education (Boeker 1997; Fondas and Wiersema 1997).  Age and tenure may also determine the risk 
attitudes of CEOs. As CEOs become older, their corporate risk-taking behaviours decrease, which, in 
turn, significantly influences firm performance (Serfling 2014). Moreover, CEOs who have worked 
for the firm for a longer time have lower incentives to establish a reputation and hence tend to be 
more risk averse (Graham 2013). There is also evidence of the association between ownership and 
compensation and strategic decision-making (e.g., Sanders and Hambrick (2007), Goodstein and 
Boeker (1991); Sanders and Hambrick (2007).  Additionally, previous studies document the link 
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between outsider CEOs and firm performance (Huson et al. 2001; Parrino 1997). Therefore, we 
control for those CEO characteristics and include the following variables in the main model 
(Equation (3)): CEO age, CEO tenure, internal hire, CEO ownership, log(total compensation), MBA, 
PhD, and Ivy League alumnus. The results reported in Table 11 indicate that specialist CEOs 
significantly reduce IPO failure risks after controlling for the impact of observable CEO 
characteristics. 
Moreover, a CEO may be selected due to the fit between the individual and job requirements. 
A firm may prefer to appoint a CEO who has managerial characteristics suitable to the firm’s 
organisational context.  Thus, our results may be biased due to this selection problem. To address the 
endogenous matching between CEOs and firms, we employ the propensity score matching 
procedure. Using this method, we compare the occurrence of delisting within five years after the 
offering of a firm with a specialist CEO with that of the same firm if it had appointed a generalist 
CEO. Initially, we measure the propensity score, which is the conditional probability of receiving the 
treatment (having a specialist CEO) given a firm’s pre-treatment characteristics, for all the IPOs by 
estimating a probit regression for the probability of firms appointing a specialist CEO. We account 
for various CEO, firm, and industry characteristics in the probit regression including log(firm age), 
log(sales), top-tier underwriter, ROA, R&D, advertising, capital expenditure, diversification, CEO-
Founder, CEO-Chairman, high-tech industry, and year dummies. Based on the propensity score, we 
match each observation in the treated group with the control group and estimate the average effect of 
the treatment on the treated (ATET) in order to evaluate the effect of specialist CEOs on the 
occurrence of delisting. Table 12 presents the results for the ATET on the occurrence of delisting for 
IPO firms with a specialist CEO versus those with a generalist CEO. The ATET is negative and 
strongly significant at the 1% level, indicating that IPO firms with a specialist CEO are less likely to 
be delisted within five years following the issue. This finding is consistent with the results presented 
in the main analysis.  
 
6.4.  Other robustness checks 
In the main analysis, we define failed firms as those that are delisted due to negative reasons. 
Several earlier studies suggest that acquired firms tend to experience financial distress (Jain and Kini 
2000; Welbourne and Andrews 1996). Thus, for robustness, we categorise failed firms as those that 
are delisted from the stock exchanges due to either negative reasons or acquisitions and re-estimate 
the main model (Equation (3)). In addition, we also check the sensitivity of our findings when 
excluding firms that have CEO turnovers within five years after the offering from the sample. The 
25 
 
results in Table 13 consistently show that specialist CEOs are negatively associated with future 
failure risks. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether specialist CEOs are associated with the probability of 
failure and survivability in post-issue periods of IPO firms. We construct a generalist skills index as 
the first factor of applying the principal component analysis to five proxies of managerial general 
ability including the number of roles which the CEO performed, the number of firms where the CEO 
was employed, the number of industry sectors where the CEO worked, whether the CEO had 
experience as a CEO in another firm, and whether the CEO used to work in a conglomerate. Based 
on the generalist skills index, we categorise CEOs into specialists and generalists. Specialist CEOs 
possess focused experience in a particular functional area, firm, and industry. Thorough 
understanding of the firm and its market environment, as well as more aligned incentives with those 
of the firm make specialist CEOs more capable and motivated to enhance the viability of IPO firms 
for longer in the future. Employing the survival analysis, we find that IPO firms with a specialist 
CEO have a lower probability of failure and a longer time to survive. Particularly, the failure risk of 
IPO firms with a specialist CEO is 35% that of firms with a generalist CEO. Furthermore, we 
unravel the specialist-generalist dimension of CEO attributes from the founder-professional 
dimension and the insider-outsider dimension. We also examine the impacts of CEOs possessing 
specialist-generalist versus founder-professional attributes and those having specialist-generalist 
versus insider-outsider attributes on the future survivability of IPO firms. The findings indicate that 
CEOs who possess a combination of specialist and professional skills and a combination of specialist 
and outside experiences can significantly enhance the survival profiles of IPO firms. However, we do 
not find evidence supporting the relation between IPO survivability and specialist CEOs who are 
founders or insiders. Our study contributes to the literature that investigates the association between 
CEO experience and firm performance. Particularly, it contributes to the IPO literature by revealing 
specialist managerial experience of CEOs as a significant determinant of IPO survival. Our findings 
also have important implications for CEO appointment decisions of IPO firms.  
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Appendix A: Variable definition 
Panel A: CEO characteristics 
Variable Definition 
CEO age Age of the CEO (in years). 
CEO gender Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is female, and zero otherwise. 
CEO tenure Number of years the CEO has worked in the firm until the IPO.  
CEO-Chairman Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero 
otherwise. 
Founder CEO Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also a founder of the firm, and zero 
otherwise. 
CEO ownership Percentage of shares owned by the CEO in the issue year. 
MBA Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO has an MBA degree, and zero otherwise.  
PhD Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO has a PhD degree, and zero otherwise.  
Ivy League alumnus Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is an alumnus of an Ivy League institution, 
and zero otherwise.  
Insider CEO Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is hired internally, and zero otherwise.  
Cash compensation A salary and bonuses of the CEO in the issue year (in thousands of dollars). 
Equity compensation Equity incentives and options granted of the CEO in the issue year (in thousands of 
dollars). 
Total compensation Total compensation of the CEO, which consists of a salary, bonuses, equity incentives, 
non-equity incentives, options, and other compensation in the issue year (in thousands of 
dollars). 
Generalist skills index First factor of applying principal component analysis to five proxies of general managerial 
skills: Number of roles, Number of firms, Number of industries, CEO experience dummy, 
and Conglomerate experience dummy. 
Specialist CEO Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is a specialist, and zero otherwise. The CEO is 
classified as a specialist if his or her generalist skills index is below the sample median. 
Generalist CEO Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is a generalist, and zero otherwise. The CEO 
is classified as a generalist if his or her generalist skills index is equal or above the sample 
median. 
Number of roles Number of roles which the CEO performed. 
Number of firms Number of firms where the CEO worked. 
Number of industries Number of industries (at four-digit SIC-code level) where the CEO worked. 
CEO experience dummy Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO worked as a CEO in another firm, and zero 
otherwise. 
Conglomerate experience dummy Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO worked in a multi-segment firm, and zero 
otherwise. 
Powerful CEO Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is powerful, and zero otherwise. The CEO is 
classified as being powerful if his or her power index is above the sample median. The 
power index is estimated by applying the principal component analysis to five proxies of 
CEO power: CEO-Chairman, CEO-Founder, CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and Ivy 
League alumnus.  
Panel B: Firm and offering characteristics 
Variable Definition 
Firm age Firm age in years measured as the difference between the firm’s IPO year and its founding 
year. Company founding years are collected from the Field-Ritter dataset.2 
Sales Total sales in the issue year.  
Profitability Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total 
assets in the issue year. 
Leverage Ratio of total debts to total assets in the issue year. 
R&D Ratio of research and development expenses to book value of total assets in the issue year. 
Advertising Ratio of advertising expenses to total assets in the issue year. 
                                                          
2 The Field-Ritter dataset is available on Jay Ritter’s webpage: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm. 
31 
 
Capital expenditure Ratio of capital expenditure to total assets in the issue year. 
Diversification Number of business segments in which the firm operates. 
Proceeds Total proceeds of the IPO.  
Big4 auditor Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is audited by a big four audit firm, and zero 
otherwise. Big four audit firms include Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Venture capitalist Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is venture backed, and zero otherwise. 
Top-tier investment bank Dummy variable that equals one if the IPO is underwritten by reputable underwriters, and 
zero otherwise. Reputable underwriters are those with a ranking score of 9.0 or above 
based on Jay Ritter’s underwriter rakings.3 
Market-to-book Ratio of market value to book value in the issue year. 
High-tech industry Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in an industry with a SIC code of 3571, 
3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications 
equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3577, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation 
equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 3841, 
3845 (medical instruments), 4812 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications 
services), 7371 – 7375, 7378, or 7379 (software), and zero otherwise. 
Delist Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is delisted within 5 years after the offering, and 
zero otherwise. 
Initial returns Stock returns on the first day of trading. 
 
                                                          
3 IPO underwriter reputation rankings are available on Jay Ritter’s webpage: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. 
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Table 1 
IPO distribution by issue year and industry  
The table presents the distribution of the overall sample and the three groups of IPO firms: survived, acquired, and failed firms. 
Survived firms are those that are still trading (delisting code of 100). Acquired firms are those that are delisted due to acquisitions 
(delisting code from 200 to 299). Failed firms are those that are delisted for negative reasons (delisting code greater than or equal 300). 
N denotes the number of observations. 
Panel A: Distribution of IPOs from 1999-2009 
 From the IPO date to December 2014 From the IPO date to five years after the offering 
 N % N % 
Failed  83 11.50 54 7.48 
Acquired 342 47.37 206 28.53 
Survived 297 41.13 462 63.99 
Total  722 100.00 722 100.00 
 
Panel B: Distribution by issue year  
Year All IPOs Failed Acquired Survived 
N N % N % N % 
1999 107 16 14.95 41 38.32 50 46.73 
2000 125 7 5.60 30 24.00 88 70.40 
2001 30 2 6.67 9 30.00 19 63.33 
2002 30 2 6.67 10 33.33 18 60.00 
2003 39 4 10.26 14 35.90 21 53.85 
2004 95 3 3.16 30 31.58 62 65.26 
2005 71 3 4.23 16 22.54 52 73.24 
2006 83 7 8.43 19 22.89 57 68.67 
2007 98 7 7.14 27 27.55 64 65.31 
2008 14 2 14.29 2 14.29 10 71.43 
2009 30 1 3.33 8 26.67 21 70.00 
Total 722 54  206  462  
Note: Delisting is tracked for five years after the IPO. 
Panel C: Distribution by industry  
Industry 
(two-digit SIC codes) 
All IPOs Failed Acquired Survived 
N N % N % N % 
Oil and gas 
(13) 
 
 
 
22 1 4.55 2 9.09 19 86.36 
Food products 
(20) 
5 1 20.00 1 20.00 3 60.00 
Chemical products 
(28) 
 
107 9 8.41 32 29.91 66 61.68 
Manufacturing 
(30 - 34) 
17 4 23.53 3 17.65 10 58.82 
Computer equipment & services 
(35, 73) 
229 18 7.86 85 37.12 126 55.02 
Electronic equipment 
(36) 
70 3 4.29 23 32.86 44 62.86 
Scientific instruments 
(38) 
60 5 8.33 19 31.67 36 60.00 
Transportation & public utilities 
(41, 42, 44 - 49) 
56 4 7.14 10 17.86 42 75.00 
Wholesale & retail trade 
(50 - 59) 
54 3 5.56 12 22.22 39 72.22 
Entertainment services 
(70, 78, 79) 
13 1 7.69 0 0.00 12 92.31 
Health services 
(80) 
19 1 5.26 5 26.32 13 68.42 
All others (01, 12, 15, 17, 22-27, 
29, 37, 39, 72, 75, 82, 87, 96) 
70 4 5.71 14 20.00 52 74.29 
Total 722 54  206  462  
Note: Delisting is tracked for five years after the IPO. 
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Table 2 
Survival distribution of IPO firms with a specialist CEO and those with a generalist CEO by issue year and industry 
The table presents the comparison of the distribution and cumulative failure rates by issue year and industry between the two groups of IPO firms: those with a specialist CEO and those with a generalist 
CEO. The cumulative number and percentage of failed firms are examined for five years after the offering. N denotes the number of observations. 
 
Panel A: Survival distribution by issue year 
 
Year CEO type 
Number and 
percentage of IPO 
firms 
Cumulative number and percentage of failed firms 
Within 1 year Within 2 years Within 3 years Within 4 years Within 5 years 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
1999 Specialist  52 48.60 0 0.00 3 5.77 4 7.69 5 9.62 6 11.54 
 Generalist  55 51.40 0 0.00 3 5.45 8 14.55 9 16.36 10 18.18 
2000 
 
Specialist  46 36.80 0 0.00 1 2.17 2 4.35 2 4.35 2 4.35 
 Generalist 79 63.20 0 0.00 3 3.80 3 3.80 5 6.33 5 6.33 
2001 Specialist  8 26.67 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
 Generalist 22 73.33 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 4.55 1 4.55 2 9.09 
2002 Specialist  7 23.33 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
 Generalist 23 76.67 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 4.35 1 4.35 2 8.70 
2003 Specialist  22 56.41 0 0.00 2 9.09 2 9.09 2 9.09 2 9.09 
 Generalist 17 43.59 1 5.88 1 5.88 1 5.88 1 5.88 2 11.76 
2004 Specialist  58 61.05 0 0.00 2 3.45 2 3.45 2 3.45 2 3.45 
 Generalist 37 38.95 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.70 
2005 Specialist  37 52.11 0 0.00 1 2.70 1 2.70 1 2.70 2 5.41 
 Generalist 34 47.89 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.94 1 2.94 
2006 Specialist  53 63.86 0 0.00 1 1.89 2 3.77 4 7.55 4 7.55 
 Generalist 30 36.14 0 0.00 2 6.67 3 10.00 3 10.00 3 10.00 
2007 Specialist  56 57.14 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 1.79 1 1.79 
 Generalist 42 42.86 0 0.00 2 4.76 3 7.14 6 14.29 6 14.29 
2008 Specialist  8 57.14 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
 Generalist 6 42.86 0 0.00 2 33.33 2 33.33 2 33.33 2 33.33 
2009 Specialist  13 43.33 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 7.69 1 7.69 
 Generalist 17 56.67 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
1999-2009 Specialist 360 49.79 0 0.00 10 2.78 13 3.61 18 5.00 20 5.56 
 Generalist 362 50.21 1 0.28 13 3.58 22 6.06 29 7.99 34 9.37 
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Panel B: Survival distribution by industry 
 
Industry  
(two-digit SIC code) 
CEO type 
Number and 
percentage of IPO 
firms 
Cumulative number and percentage of failed firms 
Within 1 year Within 2 years Within 3 years Within 4 years Within 5 years 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Oil and gas  Specialist  8 36.36 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 12.50 1 12.50 
(13) Generalist 14 63.64 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Food products Specialist  1 20.00 0 0.00 1 100.00 1 100.00 1 100.00 1 100.00 
(20) Generalist 4 80.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Chemical products Specialist  61 57.01 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 1.64 1 1.64 
(28) Generalist 46 42.99 1 2.17 1 2.17 2 4.35 6 13.04 8 17.39 
Manufacturing Specialist  10 58.82 0 0.00 2 20.00 3 30.00 3 30.00 3 30.00 
(30-34) Generalist 7 41.18 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 14.29 1 14.29 1 14.29 
Computer equipment & services Specialist  115 50.22 0 0.00 5 4.35 6 5.22 7 6.09 9 7.83 
(35, 73) Generalist 114 49.78 0 0.00 1 0.88 6 5.26 8 7.02 9 7.89 
Electronic equipment Specialist  37 52.86 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.70 1 2.70 
(36) Generalist 33 47.14 0 0.00 1 3.03 1 3.03 2 6.06 2 6.06 
Scientific instruments Specialist  27 45.00 0 0.00 1 3.70 1 3.70 2 7.41 2 7.41 
(38) Generalist 33 55.00 0 0.00 1 3.03 2 6.06 2 6.06 3 9.09 
Transportation & public utilities Specialist  23 41.07 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 4.35 1 4.35 1 4.35 
(41, 42, 44-49) Generalist 33 58.93 0 0.00 2 6.06 3 9.09 3 9.09 3 9.09 
Wholesale & retail trade Specialist  29 53.70 0 0.00 1 3.45 1 3.45 1 3.45 1 3.45 
(50-59) Generalist 25 46.30 0 0.00 1 4.00 1 4.00 1 4.00 2 8.00 
Entertainment services Specialist  6 46.15 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
(70, 78, 79) Generalist 7 53.85 0 0.00 1 14.29 1 14.29 1 14.29 1 14.29 
Health services Specialist  8 42.11 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
(80) Generalist 11 57.89 0 0.00 1 9.09 1 9.09 1 9.09 1 9.09 
All others Specialist  35 49.30 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
(01, 12, 15, 17, 22-27, 29, 37, 
39, 72, 75, 82, 87, 96) 
Generalist 35 50.70 0 0.00 4 11.43 4 11.43 4 11.43 4 11.43 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics  
The table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of U.S. IPOs over the period from 1999 to 2009. CEOs’ work experience and characteristics are illustrated in Panel A and B respectively. Firm and offering 
characteristics are reported in Panel C. The correlation matrix is provided in Panel D. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Tests of differences in means between the two sub-samples of IPO firms with a 
specialist and those with a generalist CEO are based on t-tests. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
 
Panel A: CEO work experience 
 
All IPOs 
IPOs with a specialist 
CEO 
 
IPOs with a 
generalist CEO 
 
 
 N Mean p25 p50 p75 sd Mean Mean  
Number of roles 722 5.07 3.00 5.00 7.00 2.82 3.46 6.66  
Number of firms 722 5.13 3.00 4.00 6.00 3.31 3.10 7.13  
Number of industries 722 1.47 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.93 1.00 1.94  
CEO experience dummy 722 0.52 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.70  
Conglomerate dummy 722 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.13 0.61  
Panel B: CEO characteristics 
 All IPOs 
IPOs with a 
specialist CEO 
 
IPOs with a generalist 
CEO 
 
Difference 
 
 N Mean p25 p50 p75 
7575 
 
75 
sd Mean Mean p-value 
CEO age 722 49.18 43.00 49.00 55.00 8.07 47.96 50.57 0.000 
CEO gender 722 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.03 0.04 0.228 
CEO tenure 722 4.40 1.00 3.00 6.00 4.42 4.96 3.83 0.002 
Insider CEO 722 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.29 0.24 0.040 
CEO-Chairman 722 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.39 0.34 0.070 
Founder CEO 722 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.35 0.20 0.000 
CEO ownership 722 12.63 2.10 4.30 13.88 18.66 13.76 11.48 0.055 
Cash compensation (in thousands) 722 658.11 292.16 409.76 641.15 1494.21 603.80 713.37 0.168 
Equity compensation (in thousands) 722 690.08 0.00 149.83 605.38 1938.34 553.47 829.49 0.031 
Total compensation (in thousands) 722 1666.07 444.42 805.94 1561.21 3071.64 1468.40 1866.62 0.044 
MBA 722 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.23 0.30 0.013 
PhD 722 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.13 0.08 0.031 
Ivy League alumnus 722 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.14 0.21 0.006 
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Panel C: Firm and offering characteristics 
 All IPOs 
IPOs with a 
specialist CEO 
 
IPOs with a 
generalist CEO 
 
Difference 
 
 N Mean p25 p50 p75 
7575 
 
75 
sd Mean Mean p-value 
Firm age 722 17.33 5.00 9.00 18.00 23.67 16.02 18.62 0.070 
Sales (in millions) 722 401.63 25.19 82.80 288.15 1168.94 276.70 525.86 0.002 
Profitability 722 -0.03 -0.16 0.06 0.14 0.40 -0.01 -0.05 0.024 
Leverage 722 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.23 0.13 0.16 0.024 
R&D 722 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.18 0.10 0.09 0.349 
Advertising 722 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.457 
Capital expenditure 722 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.268 
Diversification 722 1.38 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.24 1.52 0.000 
Proceeds (in millions) 722 144.68 50.00 80.50 140.00 203.36 118.92 170.30 0.000 
Initial returns 722 0.28 0.00 0.11 0.31 0.52 0.24 0.32 0.034 
Top-tier underwriter 722 0.51 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.49 0.54 0.064 
Venture capitalist 722 0.57 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.58 0.56 0.233 
Big4 auditor 722 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.28 0.91 0.93 0.133 
Market-to-book 722 4.12 1.13 2.27 4.20 7.33 4.09 4.14 0.463 
High-tech industry 722 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.473 
Delist 722 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.06 0.09 0.025 
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Panel D: Correlation matrix 
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Specialist CEO 1.000                                 
Log(firm age) 0.024 1.000                               
Log(sales) -0.044 0.558 1.000                             
Top-tier 
underwriter -0.057 0.067 0.209 1.000                           
Big4 auditor -0.041 -0.013 0.034 0.179 1.000                         
Venture 
capitalist 0.027 -0.479 -0.491 0.000 0.174 1.000                       
Profitability 0.074 0.433 0.684 0.097 0.019 -0.392 1.000                     
Leverage -0.074 0.358 0.407 0.187 0.013 -0.369 0.237 1.000                   
Market-to-book -0.004 -0.240 -0.218 -0.012 0.002 0.174 -0.159 -0.210 1.000                 
R&D 0.015 -0.199 -0.456 -0.090 -0.012 0.309 -0.540 -0.148 0.085 1.000               
Advertising -0.004 -0.072 0.035 -0.001 0.031 0.020 -0.174 -0.045 -0.020 -0.037 1.000             
Capital 
expenditure -0.023 0.020 0.145 0.052 -0.016 -0.126 0.027 0.200 -0.068 -0.124 0.125 1.000           
Diversification -0.146 0.326 0.365 0.087 -0.027 -0.308 0.180 0.284 -0.115 -0.163 -0.061 0.079 1.000         
Log(proceed) -0.141 0.321 0.630 0.327 0.107 -0.317 0.411 0.434 -0.129 -0.309 -0.035 0.112 0.305 1.000       
Initial returns -0.060 -0.264 -0.088 0.035 0.055 0.182 -0.081 -0.153 0.504 -0.042 0.007 -0.027 -0.091 -0.006 1.000     
CEO-Chairman 0.055 0.018 0.080 -0.022 -0.074 -0.032 0.108 0.059 -0.006 -0.103 -0.046 0.004 0.040 0.053 0.001 1.000   
CEO-Founder 0.173 -0.224 -0.170 -0.021 0.004 0.218 -0.094 -0.159 0.091 0.104 -0.029 -0.035 -0.131 -0.209 0.093 0.207 1.000 
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Table 4 
Estimation of Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure and time-to failure 
The table illustrates the estimation of Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure and time-to failure. All 
regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The test 
statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  
 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient  Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio 
Specialist CEO -1.048*** 0.351                  
 (-3.89)                   
Generalist skills index   0.366*** 1.443 
   (4.26)     
Log(firm age) -0.593 0.553 -0.494    0.610 
 (-1.27)  (-1.06)     
Log(sales) -0.688** 0.503 -0.690**  0.501 
 (-2.28)  (-2.32)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.487* 0.615 -0.509*   0.601 
 (-1.68)  (-1.75)     
Big4 auditor -0.417 0.659 -0.328    0.720 
 (-0.88)  (-0.70)     
Venture capitalist 0.007 1.007 -0.014    0.986 
 (0.02)  (-0.04)     
Profitability -2.119*** 0.120 -2.267*** 0.104 
 (-3.51)  (-3.84)     
Leverage 2.569*** 13.058 2.655*** 14.231 
 (3.93)  (4.17)     
Market-to-book -0.106*** 0.899 -0.107*** 0.899 
 (-2.81)  (-2.85)     
R&D -0.403 0.668 -0.464    0.629 
 (-0.61)  (-0.71)     
Advertising 2.497* 12.143 2.166*   8.723 
 (1.95)  (1.72)     
Capital expenditure -0.434 0.648 -0.144    0.866 
 (-0.30)  (-0.10)     
Diversification -0.192 0.826 -0.256    0.774 
 (-1.05)  (-1.38)     
Log(proceeds) -1.013* 0.363 -1.030**  0.357 
 (-1.92)  (-1.97)     
Initial returns 0.430* 1.537 0.496**  1.641 
 (1.91)  (2.29)     
CEO-Chairman -0.455 0.635 -0.492*   0.612 
 (-1.58)  (-1.70)     
CEO-Founder -0.225 0.798 -0.104    0.901 
 (-0.73)  (-0.34)    
     
Chi-square 203.78  204.88  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  0.000  
Number of observations 722  722  
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 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Coefficient  Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio Coefficient  Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio 
Number of roles 0.197*** 1.217                        
 (3.96)                         
Number of firms   0.146*** 1.157       
   (4.31)        
Number of industries     0.273* 1.314     
     (1.80)      
CEO experience dummy       0.540** 1.717   
       (2.07)    
Conglomerate experience dummy         0.491* 1.634 
         (1.74)  
Log(firm age) -0.529 0.589 -0.490 0.613 -0.453 0.636 -0.518 0.596 -0.433    0.648 
 (-1.11)  (-1.06)  (-0.96)  (-1.07)  (-0.92)     
Log(sales) -0.731** 0.482 -0.718** 0.488 -0.663** 0.515 -0.612** 0.542 -0.689**  0.502 
 (-2.43)  (-2.36)  (-2.23)  (-2.02)  (-2.28)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.494* 0.610 -0.415 0.661 -0.494* 0.610 -0.397 0.673 -0.486*   0.615 
 (-1.71)  (-1.42)  (-1.70)  (-1.35)  (-1.68)     
Big4 auditor -0.293 0.746 -0.256 0.774 -0.398 0.672 -0.348 0.706 -0.434    0.648 
 (-0.62)  (-0.55)  (-0.85)  (-0.72)  (-0.91)     
Venture capitalist -0.095 0.909 -0.011 0.989 -0.012 0.988 0.048 1.049 0.007    1.007 
 (-0.29)  (-0.03)  (-0.04)  (0.14)  (0.02)     
Profitability -2.395*** 0.091 -2.231*** 0.107 -2.109*** 0.121 -2.199*** 0.111 -2.273*** 0.103 
 (-4.07)  (-3.74)  (-3.53)  (-3.65)  (-3.79)     
Leverage 2.347*** 10.456 2.566*** 13.018 2.534*** 12.609 2.479*** 11.923 2.556*** 12.880 
 (3.72)  (4.20)  (4.10)  (4.00)  (4.03)     
Market-to-book -0.130*** 0.878 -0.107*** 0.899 -0.103*** 0.902 -0.100*** 0.905 -0.110*** 0.896 
 (-3.26)  (-2.84)  (-2.75)  (-2.62)  (-2.94)     
R&D -0.474 0.622 -0.306 0.737 -0.258 0.773 -0.393 0.675 -0.348    0.706 
 (-0.72)  (-0.46)  (-0.40)  (-0.59)  (-0.53)     
Advertising 1.793 6.007 2.187* 8.905 2.314* 10.114 2.400** 11.025 2.171*   8.765 
 (1.46)  (1.85)  (1.90)  (1.96)  (1.79)     
Capital expenditure -0.453 0.636 0.134 1.144 -0.401 0.669 -0.840 0.432 -0.454    0.635 
 (-0.31)  (0.09)  (-0.27)  (-0.55)  (-0.31)     
Diversification -0.195 0.823 -0.200 0.819 -0.131 0.877 -0.163 0.850 -0.206    0.814 
 (-1.09)  (-1.11)  (-0.75)  (-0.91)  (-1.12)     
Log(proceeds) -1.035** 0.355 -0.967* 0.380 -0.821 0.440 -0.779 0.459 -0.799    0.450 
 (-1.96)  (-1.88)  (-1.58)  (-1.48)  (-1.53)     
Initial returns 0.524** 1.689 0.462** 1.587 0.457** 1.579 0.432* 1.540 0.452**  1.572 
 (2.50)  (2.08)  (2.17)  (1.95)  (2.13)     
CEO-Chairman -0.434 0.648 -0.426 0.653 -0.350 0.705 -0.452 0.637 -0.387    0.679 
 (-1.50)  (-1.48)  (-1.24)  (-1.54)  (-1.35)     
CEO-Founder -0.037 0.963 -0.205 0.814 -0.245 0.783 -0.218 0.804 -0.207    0.813 
 (-0.12)  (-0.67)  (-0.81)  (-0.71)  (-0.68)     
           
Chi-square 203.29  203.54  190.89  192.23  190.83  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Number of observations 722  722  722  722  722  
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Table 5 
Estimation of Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure and time-to failure for IPO firms without 
founder CEOs and those without insider CEOs 
The table illustrates the estimation of Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure and time-to failure for the 
sample of IPO firms excluding firms with founder CEOs and the sample of IPO firms excluding firms with insider CEOs.  
All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. One, two and three asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 Excluding firms with founder 
CEOs 
Excluding firms with insider 
CEOs 
 Coefficient  Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio 
Specialist CEO -1.597*** 0.202 -0.975*** 0.377 
 (-4.30)  (-3.15)     
Log(firm age) -0.497 0.608 -0.430    0.650 
 (-0.92)  (-0.86)     
Log(sales) -0.562 0.570 -0.506    0.603 
 (-1.62)  (-1.54)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.398 0.672 -0.359    0.698 
 (-1.09)  (-1.09)     
Big4 auditor -0.067 0.936 -0.085    0.919 
 (-0.12)  (-0.15)     
Venture capitalist -0.077 0.926 -0.328    0.721 
 (-0.17)  (-0.89)     
Profitability -3.539*** 0.029 -2.801*** 0.061 
 (-4.06)  (-4.05)     
Leverage 2.301*** 9.986 2.118*** 8.312 
 (2.73)  (2.68)     
Market-to-book -0.136** 0.873 -0.050*   0.951 
 (-2.57)  (-1.67)     
R&D -1.813 0.163 -3.638**  0.026 
 (-1.23)  (-2.34)     
Advertising 2.818** 16.748 3.227*** 25.193 
 (2.03)  (2.67)     
Capital expenditure -1.285 0.277 -0.308    0.735 
 (-0.67)  (-0.19)     
Diversification -0.263 0.769 -0.283    0.753 
 (-1.08)  (-1.31)     
Log(proceeds) -1.563** 0.209 -1.123*   0.325 
 (-2.38)  (-1.85)     
Initial returns 0.709** 2.031 0.614*** 1.847 
 (2.00)  (2.58)     
CEO-Chairman -0.792** 0.453 -0.380    0.684 
 (-2.05)  (-1.20)     
     
Chi-square 186.61  172.93  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  0.000  
Number of observations 525  530  
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Table 6 
Distribution of CEOs across specialist-generalist, founder-professional and insider-outsider dimensions 
The table presents the number of CEOs across different dimensions: specialist-generalist versus founder-professional and 
specialist-generalist versus insider-outsider. Panel A tabulates our sample according to two dimensions, founder-professional 
and specialist-generalist. Panel B tabulates our sample according to two dimensions, founder-professional and specialist 
skills in quartiles. Panel C tabulates our sample according to two dimensions, insider-outsider and specialist-generalist. Panel 
D tabulates our sample according to two dimensions, insider-outsider and specialist skills in quartiles. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
 
Professional Founder Total 
Generalist 291 71 362 
Specialist 234 126 360 
Total  525 197 722 
Panel B 
 
Professional Founder Total 
Generalist 
 
 
 
 
 
Specialist 
S
p
ecialist sk
ills 
1 149 32 181 
2 139 39 178 
3 122 59 181 
4 115 67 182 
  
Total  525 197 722 
Panel C 
 
Outsider Insider Total 
Generalist 276 86 362 
Specialist 254 106 360 
Total  530 192 722 
Panel D 
 
Outsider Insider Total 
Generalist 
 
 
 
 
 
Specialist 
S
p
ecialist sk
ills 
1 145 36 181 
2 129 49 178 
3 129 52 181 
4 127 55 182 
  
Total  530 192 722 
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Table 7 
Estimation of Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure and time-to failure 
The table illustrates the estimation of Cox proportional hazards model of probability of failure and time-to failure against different dimensions of CEO characteristics: specialist-generalist versus 
founder-professional and specialist-generalist versus insider-outsider. In Panel A, CEOs are classified in four categories based on specialist-generalist and founder-professional dimensions: 
Specialist-Founder, Specialist-Professional, Generalist-Founder and Generalist-Professional. In Panel B, CEOs are classified in four categories based on specialist-generalist versus insider-
outsider dimensions: Specialist-Insider, Specialist-Outsider, Generalist-Insider and Generalist-Outsider. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are 
suppressed. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
Panel A: Specialist-generalist versus founder-professional dimensions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coefficient  Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio Coefficient  Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio 
Specialist-Founder -0.381 0.683 
 
                     
 (-0.97)                       
Specialist-Professional   -1.045*** 0.352 
 
    
   (-3.36)      
Generalist-Founder     -0.026 0.975 
 
  
     (-0.07)    
Generalist-Professional       1.104*** 3.016 
        (4.20)     
Log(firm age) -0.426 0.653 -0.638 0.528 -0.443 0.642 -0.662    0.516 
 (-0.89)  (-1.33)  (-0.91)  (-1.44)     
Log(sales) -0.691** 0.501 -0.726** 0.484 -0.693** 0.500 -0.615**  0.541 
 (-2.27)  (-2.39)  (-2.27)  (-2.10)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.450 0.638 -0.520* 0.595 -0.457 0.633 -0.459    0.632 
 (-1.56)  (-1.80)  (-1.59)  (-1.59)     
Big4 auditor -0.385 0.681 -0.457 0.633 -0.402 0.669 -0.385    0.681 
 (-0.80)  (-0.95)  (-0.84)  (-0.82)     
Venture capitalist 0.020 1.020 0.015 1.015 0.020 1.021 -0.066    0.936 
 (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (-0.20)     
Profitability -2.134*** 0.118 -2.199*** 0.111 -2.202*** 0.111 -2.360*** 0.094 
 (-3.52)  (-3.76)  (-3.63)  (-3.99)     
Leverage 2.430*** 11.356 2.823*** 16.830 2.508*** 12.278 2.555*** 12.876 
 (3.94)  (4.28)  (4.09)  (4.00)     
Market-to-book -0.109*** 0.897 -0.102*** 0.903 -0.107*** 0.899 -0.109*** 0.897 
 (-2.87)  (-2.68)  (-2.84)  (-2.94)     
R&D -0.325 0.722 -0.448 0.639 -0.321 0.726 -0.156    0.855 
 (-0.50)  (-0.69)  (-0.49)  (-0.24)     
Advertising 2.187* 8.905 2.636** 13.964 2.203* 9.055 2.487**  12.027 
 (1.82)  (2.10)  (1.86)  (2.05)     
Capital expenditure -0.549 0.578 -0.114 0.892 -0.467 0.627 -0.550    0.577 
 (-0.37)  (-0.08)  (-0.31)  (-0.37)     
Diversification -0.122 0.885 -0.158 0.854 -0.111 0.895 -0.182    0.834 
 (-0.70)  (-0.86)  (-0.64)  (-0.99)     
Log(proceeds) -0.724 0.485 -0.864 0.421 -0.681 0.506 -1.071**  0.343 
 (-1.39)  (-1.64)  (-1.32)  (-2.05)     
Initial returns 0.432** 1.541 0.375* 1.456 0.415** 1.514 0.458**  1.581 
 (2.00)  (1.79)  (1.98)  (2.14)     
CEO-Chairman -0.373 0.689 -0.591** 0.554 -0.407 0.665 -0.354    0.702 
 (-1.33)  (-2.08)  (-1.44)  (-1.27)     
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Chi-square 188.13  199.81  187.13  204.69  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Number of observations 722  722  722  722  
 
Panel B: : Specialist-generalist versus Insider-Outsider dimensions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coefficient  Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio Coefficient  Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio 
Specialist-Insider -0.788 0.455 
 
                     
 (-1.60)                       
Specialist-Outsider   -0.802*** 0.448 
 
    
   (-2.84)      
Generalist-Insider     0.240 1.271 
 
  
     (0.59)    
Generalist-Outsider       0.966*** 2.628 
       (3.71)     
Log(firm age) -0.381 0.683 -0.619 0.538 -0.456 0.634 -0.547    0.579 
 (-0.79)  (-1.29)  (-0.94)  (-1.17)     
Log(sales) -0.666** 0.514 -0.738** 0.478 -0.699** 0.497 -0.704**  0.495 
 (-2.19)  (-2.42)  (-2.31)  (-2.28)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.457 0.633 -0.489* 0.613 -0.439 0.644 -0.561*   0.571 
 (-1.59)  (-1.68)  (-1.52)  (-1.91)     
Big4 auditor -0.388 0.678 -0.428 0.652 -0.398 0.672 -0.449    0.638 
 (-0.81)  (-0.90)  (-0.83)  (-0.94)     
Venture capitalist 0.016 1.016 0.012 1.012 -0.008 0.992 0.132    1.141 
 (0.05)  (0.04)  (-0.03)  (0.40)     
Profitability -2.124*** 0.120 -2.191*** 0.112 -2.198*** 0.111 -2.069*** 0.126 
 (-3.54)  (-3.66)  (-3.68)  (-3.42)     
Leverage 2.479*** 11.926 2.620*** 13.736 2.503*** 12.217 2.616*** 13.686 
 (4.00)  (4.10)  (4.09)  (4.00)     
Market-to-book -0.109*** 0.896 -0.103*** 0.902 -0.110*** 0.896 -0.096**  0.909 
 (-2.88)  (-2.73)  (-2.88)  (-2.51)     
R&D -0.404 0.668 -0.332 0.718 -0.339 0.713 -0.391    0.677 
 (-0.61)  (-0.51)  (-0.52)  (-0.58)     
Advertising 2.157* 8.646 2.463** 11.745 2.211* 9.122 2.500**  12.183 
 (1.79)  (1.98)  (1.84)  (2.04)     
Capital expenditure -0.419 0.658 -0.423 0.655 -0.486 0.615 -0.188    0.828 
 (-0.28)  (-0.29)  (-0.33)  (-0.13)     
Diversification -0.144 0.866 -0.134 0.874 -0.119 0.888 -0.152    0.859 
 (-0.81)  (-0.75)  (-0.68)  (-0.83)     
Log(proceeds) -0.774 0.461 -0.798 0.450 -0.694 0.499 -0.918*   0.399 
 (-1.49)  (-1.52)  (-1.34)  (-1.74)     
Initial returns 0.432** 1.540 0.397* 1.487 0.426** 1.531 0.379*   1.461 
 (2.05)  (1.81)  (2.01)  (1.71)     
CEO-Chairman -0.419 0.658 -0.470* 0.625 -0.403 0.668 -0.524*   0.592 
 (-1.50)  (-1.69)  (-1.45)  (-1.87)     
         
Chi-square 190.18  195.86  187.46  200.91  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Number of observations 722  722  722  722  
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Table 8 
Estimation of Cox proportional hazards models of probability of failure and time-to failure 
controlling for high-tech industries 
The table illustrates the estimation of Cox proportional hazards models of probability of failure and time-to failure 
controlling for high-tech industries. Specification (1) includes a dummy variable high-tech industry indicating whether the 
IPO firm is in a high-tech industry, and an interaction term between specialist CEO and high-tech industry. Specification (2) 
shows the regression on the sub-sample of IPO firms in high-tech industries. Specification (3) shows the regression on the 
sub-sample of IPO firms not in the high-tech industries. All regressions include year dummies whose coefficients are 
suppressed. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. One, two and three asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 Overall IPO sample 
Sub-sample of IPOs in 
high-tech industries 
Sub-sample of IPOs not in 
high-tech industries 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio 
Specialist CEO -0.622**  0.537 -0.751*   0.472 -0.584*   0.558 
  (-1.98)     (-1.69)     (-1.76)    
High-tech industry 0.282    1.325     
 (0.88)         
Specialist CEO * High-tech industry -0.212    0.809     
 (-0.43)         
Log(firm age) -0.601    0.548 -1.110    0.329 0.229    1.257 
 (-1.48)     (-1.38)     (0.41)     
Log(sales) -0.495**  0.610 -1.297*** 0.273 -0.669**  0.512 
 (-2.13)     (-2.94)     (-2.36)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.336    0.715 -0.204    0.815 -0.452    0.636 
 (-1.24)     (-0.47)     (-1.19)     
Big4 auditor -0.232    0.793 1.119    3.063 -0.563    0.569 
 (-0.54)     (0.91)     (-1.10)     
Venture capitalist -0.369    0.691 -0.655    0.519 -0.671    0.511 
 (-1.32)     (-1.37)     (-1.38)     
Profitability -2.404*** 0.090 -1.999**  0.135 -2.972*** 0.051 
 (-4.85)     (-2.35)     (-4.68)     
Leverage 2.356*** 10.549 1.784*   5.953 2.151*** 8.595 
 (4.66)     (1.68)     (3.05)     
Market-to-book -0.099*** 0.906 -0.064    0.938 -0.309*** 0.734 
 (-2.76)     (-1.38)     (-3.54)     
R&D -2.559**  0.077 -3.722    0.024 -0.333    0.717 
 (-2.25)     (-1.59)     (-0.51)     
Advertising 2.472    11.851 8.491**  4871.218 1.320    3.744 
 (1.56)     (2.18)     (1.01)     
Capital expenditure 0.354    1.425 -1.519    0.219 1.632    5.113 
 (0.28)     (-0.52)     (1.12)     
Diversification -0.161    0.852 -0.059    0.943 -0.226    0.798 
 (-0.99)     (-0.18)     (-1.16)     
Log(proceeds) -0.684*   0.505 -0.021    0.979 -0.901*   0.406 
 (-1.66)     (-0.02)     (-1.69)     
Initial returns 0.355*   1.426 0.364    1.439 0.745**  2.107 
 (1.82)     (1.17)     (2.19)     
CEO-Chairman -0.426    0.653 -0.303    0.739 -0.321    0.725 
 (-1.62)     (-0.72)     (-0.85)     
CEO-Founder -0.164    0.849 0.287    1.332 -0.135    0.873 
 (-0.59)     (0.61)     (-0.33)     
       
Chi-square 144.19  78.14  104.33  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Number of observations 722  324  398  
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Table 9 
Estimation of Cox proportional hazards models of probability of failure and time-to-failure  
controlling for crisis periods 
The table illustrates the estimation of Cox proportional hazards models of probability of failure and time-to failure 
controlling for crisis periods including the collapse of the dotcom bubble in 2000-2001 and the financial crisis 2007-2008. 
Specification (1) includes a dummy variable crisis period indicating whether the IPO firm is in a crisis period, and an 
interaction term between specialist CEO and crisis period. Specification (2) shows the regression on the sub-sample of IPO 
firms in crisis periods. Specification (3) shows the regression on the sub-sample of IPO firms not in crisis periods. All 
regressions include industry dummies whose coefficients are suppressed. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below 
coefficient estimates. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 Overall IPO sample Sub-sample of IPOs in 
crisis periods 
Sub-sample of IPOs not in 
crisis periods 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient  Hazard ratio Coefficient  Hazard ratio Coefficient  Hazard ratio 
Specialist CEO -0.699**  0.497 -2.450*** 0.086 -0.985*** 0.373 
  (-2.18)     (-3.59)     (-2.76)    
Crisis period -0.057    0.945     
 (-0.17)         
Specialist CEO * Crisis period -0.768    0.464     
 (-1.35)         
Log(firm age) -0.586    0.557 -1.795*   0.166 -0.024    0.976 
 (-1.33)     (-1.84)     (-0.04)     
Log(sales) -0.868*** 0.420 -1.457**  0.233 -0.779**  0.459 
 (-2.98)     (-2.08)     (-2.05)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.507*   0.602 -1.796*** 0.166 -0.094    0.910 
 (-1.77)     (-2.67)     (-0.23)     
Big4 auditor -0.564    0.569 2.749    15.620 -0.529    0.589 
 (-1.30)     (1.47)     (-0.93)     
Venture capitalist -0.132    0.877 -0.273    0.761 0.161    1.174 
 (-0.41)     (-0.31)     (0.39)     
Profitability -2.004*** 0.135 -4.891*** 0.008 -3.057*** 0.047 
 (-3.40)     (-2.93)     (-3.93)     
Leverage 2.654*** 14.206 3.791*   44.319 2.841*** 17.140 
 (4.37)     (1.90)     (3.48)     
Market-to-book -0.103*** 0.902 -0.433*** 0.649 -0.075*   0.928 
 (-2.67)     (-2.70)     (-1.85)     
R&D 0.162    1.176 3.251    25.818 -5.781*** 0.003 
 (0.25)     (1.50)     (-2.85)     
Advertising 2.655**  14.219 3.923*   50.568 3.303    27.205 
 (2.11)     (1.80)     (1.28)     
Capital expenditure -0.646    0.524 -10.702*** 0.000 1.076    2.934 
 (-0.46)     (-2.61)     (0.56)     
Diversification -0.187    0.829 1.212*** 3.360 -0.557*   0.573 
 (-1.07)     (2.63)     (-1.94)     
Log(proceeds) -0.520    0.594 -2.129**  0.119 -0.489    0.613 
 (-1.07)     (-2.04)     (-0.77)     
Initial returns 0.356    1.428 0.684    1.982 0.596*   1.814 
 (1.59)     (1.55)     (1.86)     
CEO-Chairman -0.496*   0.609 -1.873*** 0.154 -0.501    0.606 
 (-1.78)     (-2.60)     (-1.37)     
CEO-Founder -0.161    0.852 0.866    2.378 -0.092    0.912 
 (-0.54)     (1.31)     (-0.24)     
       
Chi-square 192.57  134.61  139.42  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Number of observations 722  267  455  
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Table 10 
Estimation of Cox proportional hazards models of probability of failure and time-to-failure  
controlling for CEO power 
The table illustrates the estimation of Cox proportional hazards models of probability of failure and time-to failure 
controlling for CEO power. The power index is the first factor of applying principal component analysis to five proxies of 
CEO power: CEO-Chairman, CEO-Founder, CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and Ivy League alumnus. Powerful CEOs are 
identified as those whose power index is greater than the sample median. Specification (1) includes a dummy variable 
powerful CEO indicating whether the IPO firm has a powerful CEO, and an interaction term between specialist CEO and 
powerful CEO. Specification (2) shows the regression on the sub-sample of IPO firms with a powerful CEO. Specification 
(3) shows the regression on the sub-sample of IPO firms without a powerful CEO. All regressions include industry and year 
dummies whose coefficients are suppressed. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. One, 
two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 
 Overall IPO sample IPOs with powerful CEOs IPOs without powerful CEOs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient  Hazard ratio Coefficient  Hazard ratio Coefficient  Hazard ratio 
Specialist CEO -1.509*** 0.221 -1.056*   0.348 
 
-2.611*** 0.073 
  (-2.98)     (-1.89)     (-3.40)     
Powerful CEO -0.409    0.664     
 (-0.92)         
Specialist CEO * Powerful CEO 0.444    1.560     
 (0.61)         
Log(firm age) -0.735    0.480 0.038    1.039 -2.331*   0.097 
 (-1.10)     (0.04)     (-1.81)     
Log(sales) -1.049**  0.350 -2.441*** 0.087 -1.716*   0.180 
 (-2.51)     (-3.20)     (-1.77)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.561    0.570 0.336    1.399 -0.057    0.944 
 (-1.51)     (0.50)     (-0.07)     
Big4 auditor -0.360    0.698 -1.725    0.178 1.278    3.590 
 (-0.58)     (-1.55)     (0.96)     
Venture capitalist -0.187    0.829 -0.859    0.423 -0.279    0.757 
 (-0.45)     (-1.45)     (-0.29)     
Profitability -2.677*** 0.069 1.120    3.066 -5.102*** 0.006 
 (-3.21)     (0.87)     (-2.91)     
Leverage 3.937*** 51.246 4.060**  57.961 0.280    1.324 
 (3.67)     (2.01)     (0.12)     
Market-to-book -0.133**  0.875 -0.094    0.910 -0.533*** 0.587 
 (-2.46)     (-1.59)     (-2.68)     
R&D -3.977**  0.019 1.909    6.745 -3.396    0.033 
 (-2.21)     (1.38)     (-1.48)     
Advertising 3.062    21.369 -1.126    0.324 3.161    23.593 
 (1.20)     (-0.21)     (0.56)     
Capital expenditure -3.033    0.048 1.438    4.214 -5.982    0.003 
 (-1.22)     (0.36)     (-1.04)     
Diversification -0.443    0.642 0.308    1.360 -0.741    0.476 
 (-1.64)     (0.63)     (-1.28)     
Log(proceeds) -0.328    0.720 0.652    1.920 -1.951    0.142 
 (-0.50)     (0.57)     (-1.23)     
Initial returns 0.373    1.452 0.815**  2.259 0.541    1.718 
 (1.30)     (2.12)     (0.57)     
       
Chi-square 158.05  89.31  135.26  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Number of observations 722  361  256  
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Table 11 
Estimation of Cox proportional hazards models of probability of failure and time-to-failure  
controlling for CEO characteristics 
The table illustrates the estimation of Cox proportional hazards models of probability of failure and time-to failure 
controlling for CEO characteristics including CEO age, CEO tenure, internal hire, CEO ownership, total compensation, 
MBA, PhD, Ivy League alumnus. The regression includes industry and year dummies whose coefficients are suppressed. The 
test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 Coefficient  Hazard ratio 
Specialist CEO -1.340*** 0.262 
 (-3.00)     
Log(firm age) -0.935    0.393 
 (-1.16)     
Log(sales) -1.079*   0.340 
 (-1.85)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.646    0.524 
 (-1.38)     
Big4 auditor -1.125    0.325 
 (-1.63)     
Venture capitalist -0.258    0.772 
 (-0.48)     
Profitability -3.025*** 0.049 
 (-2.75)     
Leverage 5.547*** 256.550 
 (4.36)     
Market-to-book -0.152**  0.859 
 (-2.21)     
R&D -0.742    0.476 
 (-0.90)     
Advertising 2.337    10.349 
 (0.76)     
Capital expenditure -7.356*   0.001 
 (-1.76)     
Diversification -0.211    0.809 
 (-0.67)     
Log(proceeds) -0.102    0.903 
 (-0.14)     
Initial returns 0.574    1.776 
 (1.43)     
CEO-Chairman -0.322    0.724 
 (-0.65)     
CEO-Founder -0.257    0.773 
 (-0.56)     
CEO age 0.059*   1.061 
 (1.82)     
CEO tenure -0.014    0.987 
 (-0.24)     
Internal hire -0.004    0.996 
 (-0.01)     
CEO ownership 0.004    1.004 
 (0.24)     
Log(total compensation) 0.369    1.447 
 (0.56)     
MBA 0.411    1.509 
 (0.91)     
PhD 0.848    2.336 
 (1.41)     
Ivy League alumnus 0.670    1.955 
 (1.38)     
   
Chi-square 153.51  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  
Number of observations 438  
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Table 12 
Endogeneity control – Propensity score matching 
The table illustrates the analysis of the effect of specialist CEOs on the occurrence of delisting in the five year period 
subsequent to the offering, controlling for the endogeneity of CEO selection using propensity score matching. The variables 
used for matching include: log(firm age), log(sales), top-tier underwriter, ROA, R&D, advertising, capital expenditure, 
diversification, CEO-Founder, CEO-Chairman, high-tech industry, and year dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. The test statistic is shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimate. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 Delist  
ATET 
(Specialist CEO vs. Non-specialist CEO) 
-0.078*** 
(-2.80) 
  
Number of observations 722 
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Table 13 
Other robustness checks 
The table illustrates the estimation of Cox proportional hazards models of probability of failure and time-to failure. In 
specification (1), failed firms include those delisted from the stock exchanges due to either negative reasons or acquisitions. 
In specification (2), the sample excludes firms that have CEO turnovers within 5 years after the offering. All models include 
industry and year dummies whose coefficients are suppressed. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient 
estimates. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 Failed firms include those that are 
delisted from the stock exchanges for 
either negative reasons or acquisitions 
 
 IPO sample excludes firms that have CEO 
turnovers within 5 years after the offering 
 (1)  (2) 
 Coefficient  Hazard ratio  Coefficient  Hazard ratio 
Specialist CEO -0.500*** 0.606  -0.938*** 0.391 
 (-4.57)      (-2.98)     
Log(firm age) -0.353*   0.702  -1.005*   0.366 
 (-1.89)      (-1.91)     
Log(sales) -0.047    0.954  -0.510    0.601 
 (-0.36)      (-1.42)     
Top-tier underwriter 0.091    1.095  -0.609*   0.544 
 (0.81)      (-1.84)     
Big4 auditor -0.305    0.737  -0.472    0.624 
 (-1.36)      (-0.72)     
Venture capitalist 0.079    1.082  0.284    1.329 
 (0.57)      (0.75)     
Profitability -1.169*** 0.311  -2.269*** 0.103 
 (-3.74)      (-3.17)     
Leverage 1.024*** 2.784  2.356*** 10.547 
 (3.30)      (2.90)     
Market-to-book -0.027*** 0.973  -0.097**  0.907 
 (-2.90)      (-2.22)     
R&D -0.549    0.577  -3.741**  0.024 
 (-1.10)      (-2.00)     
Advertising 1.273    3.570  2.996**  20.003 
 (1.53)      (2.24)     
Capital expenditure -1.666**  0.189  0.066    1.068 
 (-2.06)      (0.04)     
Diversification -0.405*** 0.667  -0.173    0.841 
 (-4.62)      (-0.83)     
Log(proceeds) -0.257    0.774  -0.732    0.481 
 (-1.22)      (-1.20)     
Initial returns 0.192**  1.212  0.290    1.336 
 (2.10)      (1.13)     
CEO-Chairman -0.551*** 0.576  -0.768**  0.464 
 (-4.67)      (-2.28)     
CEO-Founder 0.084    1.087  -0.029    0.971 
 (0.70)      (-0.09)     
Chi-square 254.96   169.29  
Chi-square test 
probability 
0.000   0.000  
Number of observations 722   592  
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